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The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization 
abstract.  Localism, the discourse of local legal power and state-local relations, has returned 
to the center of national attention, driven by gridlock at the federal level and sharply rising political 
and cultural conﬂicts between cities and their states. In recent years, states have aggressively 
sought to constrain, eliminate, and even criminalize local policy discretion across an array of policy 
domains. Cities and their advocates have just as aggressively fought back—in litigation, in the po-
litical arena, and in popular discourse. 
 Advocacy for resurgent local empowerment is raising anew what has long been the central 
dilemma of localism: how can a vertical allocation of authority in our legal system reﬂect a general 
commitment to devolution and decentralization, yet at the same time check the worst excesses of 
local parochialism? Local governments can be great fonts of democracy, community, and policy 
innovation, but they can also be exclusionary and stubbornly unwilling to account for the external 
consequences of local decision-making. 
 This Essay proposes a new approach to the dilemma of localism in an era of polarization. To 
calibrate the allocation of state/local power in the current social and political reckoning, the nor-
mative dimensions of localism must be more directly confronted. In delineating values to deter-
mine where subsidiarity is most appropriately constrained, aspects of state law not always associ-
ated with state-local relations can provide normative guidance. State constitutional individual-
rights provisions, addressing equality and equity in many states, as well as employment, educa-
tion, social welfare, and the environment, bear on the normative commitments states have under-
taken. And the too-often neglected idea that when states delegate authority to local governments, 
local governments must act cognizant of the broader general welfare of the state provides a com-
plementary structural principle to import normative concerns into the vertical allocation of power. 
 To be sure, there are limits to the judicial capacity to apply a more equitable localism, and the 
values at issue are contestable. But a normative lens on localism foregrounds what is truly at stake 
in contemporary state/local conﬂicts. In short, it is critical to ask not just what localism is, but 
what localism is for. Properly framed, law can ﬁnd a jurisprudential and institutional path to an 
answer. 
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introduction  
On August 28, 2015, St. Louis enacted an ordinance that would have raised 
the minimum wage in the city to $11 per hour. The move sparked a protracted 
ﬁght with the Missouri General Assembly over state preemption that included 
an en banc Missouri Supreme Court decision
1
 and a legislative override making 
clear that Missouri’s cities cannot regulate minimum wages. In the end, the state 
prevailed, rolling back wage increases that had already begun to change the eco-
nomic and social landscape of the city.
2
 
The ﬁght between St. Louis and Missouri over the minimum wage is hardly 
an outlier today. Once-neglected questions concerning the state-local relation-
ship and the basic role of cities and other local governments in our federal system 
have recently taken on renewed urgency.
3
 Traditionally, states have invoked their 
power over local authority periodically to vindicate concerns about statewide 
regulatory uniformity or to address particularly signiﬁcant interlocal conﬂicts. 
As rising political and cultural polarization exacerbates long-standing urban/ru-
ral conﬂicts, however, progressive cities ﬁnd themselves increasingly at odds 
with conservative state legislatures. The state-level redistricting that followed 
the 2010 census, which accelerated uniﬁed partisan control in many states, in-




States in recent years have preempted local initiatives and removed local au-
thority across a wide array of policy domains.
5
 Charlotte, for example, found it-
self in a conﬂict that garnered national attention when North Carolina barred 
 
1. See Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. 2017) (ﬁnding that the 
city had acted within its home-rule authority and was not substantively preempted and strik-
ing down a state preemption statute for procedural defects in enactment). 
2. See David A. Graham, How St. Louis Workers Won and Then Lost a Minimum-Wage Hike, AT-
LANTIC (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/st-louis 
-minimum-wage-preemption/538182 [https://perma.cc/5F2G-RKWV]. 
3. See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Inno-
vation, 47 PUBLIUS 403 (2017); City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis 
2018 Update, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (2018), https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2017-03
/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/N434-J5QQ]. 
4. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133, 
140, 143-45 (2017); David Swindell et al., Navigating the Waters Between Local Autonomy and 
State Preemption, ALLIANCE FOR INNOVATION 17 (Oct. 2017), https://transformgov.org/sites
/transformgov.org/ﬁles/2017%20BIG%20Ideas%20Work%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5PLZ-CX6X] (analyzing factors that exacerbate preemption conﬂicts). 
5. The examples in this paragraph are described in detail below. See infra Part I. 
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the city’s effort to add LGBT protection to its municipal antidiscrimination or-
dinance. States have overridden local laws addressing not just minimum wages, 
but also paid sick leave, fair scheduling, and other employee protections. States 
are also barring local policies that welcome immigrants and protect public safety 
by facilitating law enforcement cooperation with immigrant communities in so-
called sanctuary cities. Similar conﬂicts are playing out in public health, housing, 
environmental protection, ﬁrearm safety, the sharing economy, broadband, and 
other areas. 
Even more signiﬁcantly, state oversight is turning punitive, with states 
threatening to withdraw funding from local governments and opening local gov-
ernments to novel forms of liability over policy disputes.
6
 States are now even 
exposing individual local officials to penalties—including removal from office, 
civil ﬁnes, and criminal sanctions—in preemption conﬂicts.
7
 To call this a sea 
change in state-local relations would be an understatement. 
Local governments and their advocates have hardly acquiesced, mounting a 
series of hotly contested lawsuits to defend local autonomy and local democracy. 
This burgeoning litigation challenging the new wave of preemption involves a 
variety of structural doctrines at the core of the state-local relationship, including 
home rule and state constitutional bans on special legislation. Recent cases have 
also involved federal constitutional claims, including equal protection, due pro-
cess, and the First Amendment, reﬂecting the individual rights at issue in many 
of these conﬂicts. Somewhat surprisingly, given their nominal lack of formal au-
thority, local governments have prevailed in a not-insigniﬁcant number of cases.
8
 
At the fulcrum of these renewed conﬂicts is a critical question that is the fo-
cus of this Essay. Current advocacy for local governments is often motivated by 
interest in protecting local policies that advance equity and inclusion. The legal 
arguments advocates invoke in these conﬂicts, however, could just as easily be 
turned against the very values they are defending through local autonomy. After 
all, as much as local governments can advance economic fairness, social justice, 
and policy innovation, they can—and often do—use their power as a tool of ex-
clusion, reinforcing racial and socioeconomic inequality. 
This is the double-edged sword of localism: local empowerment can be used 
for desirable as well as pernicious ends. This dilemma raises the critical theoret-
ical and doctrinal question whether it is possible to craft a coherent, principled 
 
6. See Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 
GEO. L.J. 1469 (2018); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
1163 (2018). 
7. See Scharff, supra note 6, at 1498-1502. 
8. For an overview of the emerging jurisprudence, see infra Part I. 
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approach to local legal power justiﬁed by the traditional values associated with 
localism—preserving the space for local democracy, community, and participa-
tion, as well as fostering local innovation and the general beneﬁts of political 




It only takes a few examples to put the question in concrete terms. Is it pos-
sible to construct an approach to localism that protects Bloomington’s desire to 
enact inclusionary zoning from preemption by Indiana, while still vindicating 
New Jersey’s restrictions on local governments that use zoning to bar low-in-
come people and people of color from a community? Is there an approach that 
can bar Texas from enacting a punitive anti-sanctuary-city law, but justify Illi-
nois’s prosanctuary laws? The same question can be asked about Ohio’s preemp-
tion of a Cleveland law mandating local hiring in public projects versus Califor-
nia’s restriction on the City of Vista’s desire to avoid paying prevailing wages on 
public construction projects. Similar examples abound—indeed, they are baked 
into the very nature of contemporary localism. 
Reconciling these crosscurrents is not particularly difficult if the goal is 
simply to vindicate policy preferences. It is perfectly consistent to support or re-
ject local autonomy in the service of any particular outcome (such as more af-
fordable housing or fewer regulatory restrictions on development), giving con-
tingent support for an allocation of authority that tends to achieve that outcome. 
But the task is more challenging if the search is for a set of structural principles 
that can be applied consistently to delineate the allocation of state/local authority 
in ways that provide tools for advocates and legal actors to reﬂect the true stakes 
of the conﬂicts at issue.
10
 
This question is hardly new in the literature, even if it has taken on new sa-
lience and a distinctive partisan valence.
11
 Scholarly attempts to grapple with the 
 
9. In tackling this problem, it is helpful to remember that a variety of state and federal doctrines, 
both structural and rights-based, shape the metes and bounds of local legal identity. See Rich-
ard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1990). The constitutional status of state authority over local governments, once thought 
of as plenary, see Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), has gradually been modiﬁed 
through waves of state constitutional home-rule reform, see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home 
Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2277-2322 (2003), while individual rights and the interpretation 
of state statutes also inform important aspects of the jurisprudence of localism. 
10. Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
11. Nor is the question of general principles that offer the appropriate approach to vertical allo-
cation of power unique to localism—the same issues pertain, albeit with different constraints, 
in the broader discourse of federalism. See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Norma-
tive and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994). 
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dilemma of localism have fallen along several general lines.
12
 Some scholars have 
argued in favor of subsidiarity—the concept that authority in a political order 
should rest with the level of governance closest to those governed—without sig-
niﬁcant qualiﬁcation, taking the position that the beneﬁts of devolution and de-
centralization outweigh the costs of local empowerment. This approach has the 
virtue of consistency, but ultimately pays insufficient attention to the risks of 
exclusion and other local threats to fundamental values. Other scholars have ad-
vanced approaches to calibrating the balance of state and local power that look 
to the states to strike the right balance or that emphasize more functional or for-
mal grounds of decision. These perspectives likewise offer much wisdom, but 
the states in the present environment are too often untrustworthy stewards of 
their oversight authority, and traditional functional and formal approaches ob-
scure the underlying nature of the conﬂicts at issue.
13
 
This Essay argues for a different approach. It takes as its premise the inher-
ently normative nature of the allocation of power in the states. This normativity 
is implicit in much of the discourse—and occasionally rises to the surface in the 
jurisprudence—but it is important to be forthright about the unavoidability of 
making often deeply contested normative choices, rather than applying nomi-
nally functional or formal approaches, in structuring local power.
14
 
The critical task then becomes discerning the appropriate content for that 
normativity. The Essay argues for drawing on the intersection of two areas of 
state constitutional doctrine. The ﬁrst is state individual-rights provisions, from 
which courts and litigants can derive operative values. The existence of these 
provisions demonstrates that states are not, in fact, indifferent to considerations 
 
12. See infra Section II.B. 
13. Some scholars have reacted to the dilemma of localism by offering provocative, far-reaching 
proposals for fundamentally reordering state-local relations or rethinking the nature of local 
identity. See infra note 92. These accounts have value in pushing the boundaries of our con-
ceptions of localism, but they can be challenging to translate into practical jurisprudence. 
Given the immediacy of the conﬂicts facing the legal system, this Essay takes a more prag-
matic, doctrinal focus, while still recognizing that it is worth attending to more foundational 
concerns. 
14. To be clear, this Essay explores consequences of the premise that subsidiarity is an appropriate 
general principle to shape localism, subject to a burden of justifying allocations of power to 
other levels of government. See Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, 55 NOMOS 259, 269-
75 (2014). This premise is subject to contestation, of course, and our federal and state consti-
tutional system has a decidedly more centralizing bent as a matter of positive law. See infra 
note 96. A perspective more skeptical of devolution would shift the dilemma of localism to 
the somewhat different question of whether, in any instance, there is justiﬁcation for local 
authority. 
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of equity, inclusion, and similar concerns.
15
 Indeed, nearly every state has some 
form of equality norm enshrined in its state constitution.
16
 Many states, more-
over, have provisions that advance education, social welfare, environmental pro-




A second, distinct source of normative content for localism lies in the often-
ignored concept that the general welfare of the state is inherent in the delegation 
of legal authority to geographically bounded local communities. This structural 
principle has the potential to be deeply normative, given that the inquiry into 
what constitutes the general welfare of a state transcends the interests of any 
locality. Taking this concept seriously would mean that state delegation carries 
inherent limits on the ability of local governments to wall themselves off from 
the larger context in which their policies operate. Thus, the logic of home rule—
even in states that have recognized strong protection for local autonomy—can 
nonetheless focus attention on particularly important normative externalities 




15. As discussed below, infra Section III.A, this is not to dismiss the potential for federal consti-
tutional rights to serve as normative guidance as well. For state courts deciding challenging 
questions of state structure, however, one reason for looking to state constitutional rights pro-
visions (as opposed to federal) is that doing so holistically reﬂects the allocation of state and 
local authority of each given state’s overall legal and constitutional culture. When seeking a 
normative baseline for vertically distributing legal power, state constitutions are thus the ap-
propriate starting point. Variation among the states gives force to this argument, allowing 
each state to make its own normative commitments. 
16. For discussions of state equality guarantees, see, for example, Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State 
Equal Protection: Its Diverse Guises and Effects, 66 ALB. L. REV. 599 (2003); Jeffrey M. Shaman, 
The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013 (2003); and Robert 
F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985). 
17. See infra Section III.A.2. 
18. Some home-rule states, such as California and Colorado, among others, recognize a theoret-
ically irreducible core of “local” or “municipal” matters over which local governments enjoy 
both the ability to initiate policy without prior state approval and the power to trump the state 
in the case of conﬂicts with state law. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 349 (8th ed. 2016); Paul Diller, Intrastate 
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1125-27 (2007). These are so-called imperio states, labeled in 
recognition of early case law that described this form of home rule as an empire within an 
empire—imperium in imperio. In most home-rule states, however, local governments enjoy 
broad initiative authority but relatively little immunity from state oversight. BRIFFAULT & 
REYNOLDS, supra, at 350; Diller, supra, at 1126. And the most state-focused version of local 
legal identity, known as “Dillon’s Rule,” still pertains in some jurisdictions or for some local 
governments in home-rule states. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra, at 327-30; Diller, supra, at 
1126-27. 
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The interplay between these mutually reinforcing sources of normative con-
straint on localism yields an important insight. Together, these doctrinal regimes 
can cabin the judicial role in discerning the outer boundaries of local authority 
within a general case for devolution and decentralization.
19
 Any satisfying ap-
proach to the dilemma of localism must reﬂect normative values that are clearly 
discernible from within state constitutional law and that are equally grounded 
in the logic of local power itself.
20
 
This framework carries challenges that are important to acknowledge. Most 
notable are the limits on the judicial capacity to apply a more equitable localism 
and the inherent contestability of the normative values at issue.
21
 Yet these chal-
lenges are by no means insurmountable, and there is value in making as strong 
a case as possible for a normative lens on localism and in thinking through the 
limitations of that case with care. If nothing else, this Essay seeks to accomplish 
that ﬁrst step. 
The Essay proceeds in three Parts. The ﬁrst canvases the rise of the new wave 
of state preemption of local policy discretion and the renewed salience it brings 
to the dilemma of localism. Part II frames that dilemma more precisely and ex-
plains the limits of past attempts to respond. Finally, Part III articulates an alter-
native framework that prioritizes normative considerations, allowing the legal 
system to privilege localism while tempering local empowerment at the margins. 
This balancing inevitably raises doctrinal and institutional challenges, but it in-




19. It is important in approaching questions of localism to account for the multiple relationships 
that shape local legal identity—vertical (the local relationship with the state) and horizontal 
(interlocal relationships), as well as the relationship between local governments and both in-
dividuals and the private sector. See GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD & DAVID J. BARRON, 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at vi (5th ed. 2010) (noting that local legal 
identity involves three kinds of interaction: “[B]etween cities and higher levels of govern-
ment, between neighboring cities, and between cities and the people who live within their 
boundaries”). 
20. This Essay’s normative structural argument focuses primarily on the judicial interpretation of 
the appropriate balance between state and local authority in conﬂicts where that question 
arises. But other legal (and nonlegal) institutions also shape local legal identity, including 
state legislatures and Congress, federal and state administrative agencies, and even state con-
stitutional drafters, given the relative frequency with which state constitutions are amended 
and revised. See generally GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL 
AUTONOMY (1985). 
21. See infra Section III.B. 
22. Scholars have begun to grapple with the current landscape of preemption and state/local con-
ﬂicts. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995 
(2018); Scharff, supra note 6; Schragger, supra note 6; Stahl, supra note 4. This burgeoning 
literature has done important work on emerging state/local conﬂicts, especially in terms of 
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i .  localism’s renewed urgency  
The basic terms of local legal identity are once again ﬁercely contested. In the 
history of state-local relations there have been periodic moments in which fun-
damental questions of the balance of authority, devolution, and decentralization 
within the states have come forcefully to the surface. What then-Professor David 
Barron has described as the ﬁrst wave of home-rule reform—following the nine-
teenth century’s predominant state-centered approach
23
—was largely an effort 
of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century urban reformers, channeling 
Progressive Era concerns about democratic failure and the need to professional-
ize governance.
24
 A second wave of major home-rule reform, in the middle of 
the twentieth century, reﬂected signiﬁcant shifts brought about by the postwar 
boom in suburban living.
25
 Although there has always been a push and pull—
legally, politically, and culturally—between states and their local governments, 




We have suddenly found ourselves in one of those constitutional moments.
27
 
It is difficult to say for certain why this is the case, but a few dynamics are at play. 
First, we are in an era of sharply polarized politics, exacerbated by patterns of 
geographic mobility in which the like-minded are increasingly living together, 
apart from those with differing political and cultural outlooks.
28
 Following the 
 
doctrine and the political economy of preemption. This Essay, by contrast, focuses on how to 
reconcile defenses of local authority with continuing normative concerns about localism. 
23. See supra note 18 (discussing Dillon’s Rule). The prevailing pre-home-rule approach embod-
ied in Dillon’s Rule arguably displaced an earlier, more localist conception of state-local rela-
tions. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism 
from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern Localism, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 74, 94-99 (1989) (dis-
cussing theories of the inherent sovereignty of local governments); see also David J. Barron, 
The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 515-21 
(1999) (exploring the consequences of Thomas Cooley’s conception of local governments as 
important political institutions that bring substantive constitutional values to life). 
24. Barron, supra note 9, at 2288-2322. 
25. Id. at 2325-28. 
26. Cf. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 266-94 (1998) (discussing dy-
namics of periodic fundamental constitutional change outside the course of normal lawmak-
ing). 
27. The current resurgence of interest in local governments—and cities in particular—is reﬂected 
in the popular literature as well. See, e.g., BRUCE KATZ & JEREMY NOWAK, THE NEW LOCALISM: 
HOW CITIES CAN THRIVE IN THE AGE OF POPULISM (2017). 
28. See David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 
114-17 (2017) (noting that there have been declines in overall mobility, but also that patterns 
of mobility have shifted to allow those with means to remain geographically mobile, further 
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2010 census, many state legislative districts were redistricted in ways that locked 
in partisan advantages—mostly in states with conservative legislatures—further 
distancing state legislatures from the median state voter as well as from increas-
ingly progressive cities in many states.
29
 There is evidence of a tipping point in-
stitutionally with respect to preemption when a single party takes control of both 
houses of a state legislature as well as the governorship—at that moment, re-
gardless of party, state oversight of local governments becomes much more in-
trusive.
30
 Finally, there are networks of policy entrepreneurs with a generally de-
regulatory orientation that have increasingly focused on local governments as a 
locus for advocacy, with some success.
31
 
As a result, states in recent years have sought to constrain or remove local 
authority across a striking range of policy areas and with increasing vehe-
mence.
32
 This wave of preemption reﬂects a mix of deregulatory libertarian-
ism—particularly focused on employment, the environment, and technology—
and social conservatives’ concerns about religious liberty and reducing immigra-
tion, forming a shared agenda of reducing local power.
33
 
A number of high-proﬁle state/local fault lines have emerged from these dy-
namics. On civil rights, North Carolina preempted Charlotte’s authority to add 
 
concentrating populations of those unable to move). See generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: 
WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2008) (analyzing the 
reasons for and implications of the United States’ geographic ideological separation). 
29. See Richard Briffault et al., The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progressive 
Cities and How Cities Can Respond, 11 ADVANCE 3, 3 (2017); Riverstone-Newell, supra note 3, 
at 406-07. For an analysis of the urban/rural political divide in contemporary state-local rela-
tions, see generally Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban Disadvantage in 
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287 (2016), and for an in-depth exploration of 
this dynamic as it has exacerbated the current wave of state/local conﬂicts, see generally Stahl, 
supra note 4. 
30. Swindell et al., supra note 4, at 13-15 (analyzing data on state preemption between 2001 and 
mid-2017 and concluding that roughly three-quarters of preemption occurs when one party 
has a “trifecta” of both houses of a state legislature and the governorship). 
31. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 22, at 2001 (discussing the work of the American Legislative 
Exchange and its subsidiary the American City Council Exchange in promoting and providing 
templates for state preemption of local regulation). 
32. For other overviews of these rising state/local conﬂicts, see Briffault, supra note 22; Briffault 
et al., supra note 29; Scharff, supra note 6; and Schragger, supra note 6. 
33. Race, moreover, has been a recurring leitmotif in many of the current state/local conﬂicts, 
given the alignment of majority-minority cities in states with predominantly white legisla-
tures. See States Preempting Local Laws Are an Extension of Jim Crow, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORK-
ING FAMILIES (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/blog/states-preempting 
-local-laws-are-extension-jim-crow [https://perma.cc/MQ5R-AENT] (noting, for example, 
that Birmingham’s population is 73% black while the Alabama Legislature is 75% white; and 
that Cleveland is 53% black while the Ohio Legislature is 86% white). 
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LGBT antidiscrimination protection to its local ordinances, leading to turmoil 
that brought preemption conﬂicts to the national conversation.
34
 Arkansas and 
Tennessee have similarly preempted local antidiscrimination laws, and so-called 
“bathroom bills” have become a signiﬁcant ﬂashpoint in many states.
35
 Relat-
edly, on immigration, at least nine states now have legislation limiting so-called 
sanctuary cities,
36
 with a wave of new legislation still emerging.
37
 
Similar issues have arisen in other policy areas. In workplace regulation, at 
least twenty-ﬁve states preempt local minimum wage rules,
38
 at least nineteen 
states preempt local sick-leave policies,
39
 and at least twelve states preempt local 
 
34. See Schragger, supra note 6, at 1178 & n.81, 1183, 1223-25. 
35. Id. at 1165-66, 1228. 
36. ALA. CODE § 31-13-5 (LexisNexis 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (West, Westlaw through 
2018 Legis. Sess.); IND. CODE § 5-2-18.2-3 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 825.4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2018 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-1-119 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-145.5 
(2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-170 (Westlaw through 2018 Act 266); TENN. CODE ANN.  
§ 4-59-103 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.053 
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. & 1st Called Sessions of the 85th Leg.). The term “sanc-
tuary city” has no ﬁxed meaning, but generally refers to local governments that adopt inclu-
sive policies regarding undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary 
Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 576 (2010). 
37. Florida’s CS/HB 9, labelled the “Rule of Law Adherence Act,” introduced in 2017, would have 
been one of the more extreme examples had it passed. The proposed statute would have ex-
posed local governments with “sanctuary-city” policies to ﬁnes of $1,000 to $5,000 per day 
and denied them state funding for ﬁve years; it would have subjected such local governments 
to vicarious liability for actions of undocumented immigrants; and it would have provided for 
the removal from office of local officials who support sanctuary policies. H.R. 9 (Fla. 2018). 
38. ALA. CODE § 25-7-45 (LexisNexis 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-321(b) (Supp. 2017); ARK. 
CODE. ANN. § 11-4-221 (LEXIS through 2018 Fiscal Sess. & 2d Extraordinary Sess.); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 8-6-101 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 218.077 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-4-3.1 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 44-1502 (LEXIS through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE. 
ANN. § 22-2-2-10.5 (LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 331.304(12), 364.3(12)(a) (West 
2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,130 (Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.016 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:642 (Supp. 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.1392 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Mich. Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-1-51 (Supp. 2017); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2018, chs. 1-321); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-25.1, 153A-449, 160A-20.1 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 160 (West 
Supp. 2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 653.017, 653.025 (2017); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 333.114a (West 2009); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-12-25 (West 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-130 
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-2-112 to -113 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.); TEX. LAB. 
CODE ANN. § 62.0515 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-40-106 (LexisNexis 2015); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 104.001 (West 2018). 
39. ALA. CODE § 25-7-41 (LexisNexis 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-222 (LEXIS through 2018 Fis-
cal Sess. & 2d Extraordinary Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 218.077 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-4-3.1 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-16-3 (LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 331.304(12), 364.3(12)(a) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,130 (Supp. 2017); KY. REV. 
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regulation of other types of employee beneﬁts.
40
 Similarly, with regard to public 
health, thirty-one states now preempt in some form local regulation of tobacco 
products,
41
 and at least seven states preempt local regulation of e-cigarettes or 
alternative tobacco products;
42
 at least twelve states preempt local nutrition and 
 
STAT. ANN. § 65.016 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:642 (Supp. 2017); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 123.1381 to .1396 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. 
Sess., 99th Mich. Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-51 (Supp. 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11D-8 
(West, Westlaw through L.2018, c. 125 & J.R. No. 10); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-449, 160A-
20.1 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 160 (West Supp. 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.661 
(West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. & 2018 Spec. Sess., 79th Legis. Assemb.); 28 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 28-57-8 (West 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-25 (Supp. 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 7-51-1802 (Supp. 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.10 (West 2018). 
40. ALA. CODE § 25-7-41 (LexisNexis 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-221 (LEXIS through 2018 Fis-
cal Sess. & 2d Extraordinary Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 218.077 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-4-3.1 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-16-3 (LexisNexis 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 331.304(12), 364.3(12)(a) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,130 (Supp. 2017); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 65.016 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.1389 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.85 (Lex-
isNexis Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-25 (Supp. 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-51-1802 
(Supp. 2018). 
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118950 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19A-342 (2017); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1116, 1127 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.209 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE § 
39-5713 (2011 & Supp. 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-39-1 (LexisNexis 2011); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 453A.56 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 438.300 (2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.8 
(2018); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 16-202 (LexisNexis 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
64C, § 2 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 205.434, 333.12915, 750.42A (West 2004); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-32-2 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 202.249(4) (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155:66 (West, Westlaw through 
ch. 379 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-49-11 (LexisNexis 2014); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 14-313(e), 130A-498 (2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 600.10 (West Supp. 2018); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1527 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.775 (2017); 35 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. § 637.11 (West 2017); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 301 (West 2016); 72 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 232-A (West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504 (2015); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-46-6 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1551 (2018); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 
§§ 154.101, 155.041 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-6 (LexisNexis 2013); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-105.1(8) (LexisNexis 2017 & Supp. 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2828 (2018); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.155.130, 70.160.011 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-9A-5 
(LexisNexis 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 134.65, .66 (West Supp. 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 139.43 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 254.92 (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-308(b) 
(2017); see also State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/statesystem/preemption.html 
[https://perma.cc/K4MJ-RYKF]. 
42.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-57-267 (2014 & Supp. 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 453A.56 (West 2016); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.249(4) (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 600.10 
(West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-46-20 
(Supp. 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.345.210 (West Supp. 2017). 




 and at least forty-four states preempt local authority related to 
ﬁrearms.
44
 On local environmental protection, at least eight states preempt local 
regulation of oil and gas drilling and conservation efforts,
45
 at least twelve states 
preempt localities from regulating or placing fees on plastic bags,
46
 and at least 
 
43. ALA. CODE § 20-1-7 (LexisNexis 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6015 (Westlaw through 1st 
Spec. and 2d Reg. Sess. of 53d Leg. (2018)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1380 (2013); CAL. 
REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 7284.8 to .10; .12 to .16 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.032 (West 
2007 & Supp. 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-373 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,137 (Supp. 
2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 123.711, .713, 289.1107 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, 
No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Mich. Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-29-901 (2016); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 160A-203 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.53 (LexisNexis 2015); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 10-8-44.5 (LexisNexis 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0418 (West 2014). 
44. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; ALA. CODE § 13A-11-61.3 (LexisNexis 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.145 
(2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-16-504 (2013); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 14-54-1411 (1998); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53071, 53071.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-12-105.6(b) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-11.7-103 (West 2017); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 330(c) (2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 111(a) (LEXIS 
through 81 Del. Laws, ch. 453); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
11-173(b)(1) (2018); IDAHO CODE § 18-3302J (2016); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/13.1 (West 
2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-11.1-2 (LexisNexis 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.28 (West 
Supp. 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,124 (Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870 (Lexis-
Nexis 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1796 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2011 (Supp. 
2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-209 (LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 123.1102 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Mich. Leg.); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.633 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-51 (2015); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 21.750 (West Supp. 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-351 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 244.364, 268.418, 269.222 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:26 
(Westlaw through ch. 379 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-409.40 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 62.1-01-03 (Supp. 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68 (LexisNexis 2015); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24 (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.170 (2017); 18 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. § 6120 (West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-58 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-31-510 (Supp. 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 7-18A-36, 8-5-13, 9-19-20 (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314 (2018); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 229.001 (West 2016); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-500 (LexisNexis 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2295 (2016); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 15.2-915 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.290 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8-12-5a (LexisNexis 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0409(2) (West Supp. 2017); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-8-401 (2017). 
45. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-105 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:28F (2017); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 70-2-6 (LexisNexis 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-415.1 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1509.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 137.1 (West Supp. 2018); TEX. 
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West Supp. 2017); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-2 (LexisNexis 
2014). 
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-500.38, 11-269.16 (Supp. 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6099A 
(LEXIS through 81 Del. Laws, ch. 453); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.7033 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-2340 (2014 & Supp. 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3-8.6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 331.301(6)(c) (West Supp. 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.592 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Mich. Leg.); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
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forty-two states preempt local pesticide regulation.
47
 Finally, with respect to 
technology and innovation, twenty-one states preempt local authority over some 
form of municipal communications provision (telephone, TV, or internet),
48
 





§ 471.9998 (West Supp. 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-73 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 260.283 (West 2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0961 (West 
2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0419 (West Supp. 2017). 
47. ALA. CODE § 2-27-5.1 (LexisNexis 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-3602 (Supp. 2017); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 20-20-266 (2014); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 11501.1 (West 2001); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-10-112(3), -112.5 (West Supp. 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22A-54 (2017); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1203 (2001 & Supp. 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 482.242 (West 2015); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 2-7-113.1 (Supp. 2017) ; IDAHO CODE § 22-3426 (2009); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
60/3 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-16-5-71 (LexisNexis 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 206.34 
(West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2480 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217B.270 (LexisNexis 
2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:3224 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 132B, § 1 (West 2015); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.8328 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18B.02 (West 2010); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 69-23-9 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 281.005 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 80-
8-120 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2625 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 430:49 (LexisNexis 
2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 76-4-9.1 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 33-
0303(1) (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-435 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 4.1-34-06 
(Supp. 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 921.02 (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, § 3-84 
(West Supp. 2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 634.057 (2017); 3 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 111.57 
(West 2008); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-9 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-13-30 (2017); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 39-1-17 (Supp. 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-8-114 (2007); TEX. AGRIC. 
CODE ANN. § 76.003 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-3907 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.21.010 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-16A-2 (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 94.701 (West Supp. 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-352 (2017). 
48. ALA. CODE §§ 11-50B-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409, 23-18-804 
(2015); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 29-27-201 to -202 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 350.81 
(West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.047 (West 2000); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:844.49 to .50 
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.2252 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 237.19 (West 
2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 392.410(7) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-17-603 (2017); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 86-594 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 710.147 (LexisNexis 2014); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 268.086 (LexisNexis 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-340.1 (2017); 66 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 3014(h) (West Supp. 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2620 (2015); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-52-601, 7-59-316 (2015); TEX. UTIL. CODE § 54.202 (West 2015); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 10-18-201 to -204 (LexisNexis 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2160 (2018); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 56-265.4:4 (Supp. 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-484.7:1 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 54.16.330 (West Supp. 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0422 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 37-15-413 (2017). 
49. ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.148 (LEXIS through 2018 SLA, all legis.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-
500.39, 11-269.17 (Supp. 2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-142 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
13-720 (2015); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5445.2 (West Supp. 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-
10.1-603 (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1922 (Supp. 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 509.032(7)(b), 627.748(15) (West Supp. 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191 (2018); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10C-701 to -705 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017); IDAHO CODE § 67-6539 
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As broadly as these preemptive laws sweep, states are also becoming more 
targeted and punitive in asserting oversight of local governments, no longer con-
tent simply to check or withdraw local authority.
50
 An Arizona statute, for exam-
ple, now conditions state revenue-share funding on local governments affirma-
tively repealing preempted local laws and requires local governments to post an 
almost conﬁscatory bond to challenge the contested preemption.
51
 
Moreover, states for the ﬁrst time have begun enacting penalties against in-
dividual local officials in the event of policy conﬂicts. Oklahoma began this trend 
 
(Supp. 2018); IDAHO CODE § 49-3715 (2016); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 57/32 (West 2016); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-2-4 (LexisNexis 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321N.11 (West 2017); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-2720 (Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.630 to .6301 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1677 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 10-406 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 159A 1/2, § 10 (West Supp. 2018); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.2115 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess., 
99th Mich. Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-8-37 (2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 387.430 (West Supp. 
2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-12-342 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706A.310 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376-A:17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39:5H-26 (Supp. 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-7-18 (LexisNexis 2017); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 
§ 182 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2018, chs. 1-321); N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8) 
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2018, chs. 1-321); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.10 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 39-34-06 (Supp. 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4925.09 (LexisNexis 2017); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 1030 (West Supp. 2018); 66 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2603 
(West Supp. 2018); 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-14.2-18 (Supp. 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-
1710 (Supp. 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-15-302 (2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2402.003 
(West Supp. 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-51-109 (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 10-8-85.4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-50-338 (LexisNexis 2017); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 46.2-2099.46 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.177.010 (West Supp. 2017); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-29-19 (LexisNexis 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.1014, 440.465 (West 
Supp. 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-111 (2017). 
50. For discussions of “punitive,” “hyper,” or “nuclear” preemption—scholars have yet to settle 
on consistent vocabulary—see Briffault, supra note 22; Scharff, supra note 6; and Schragger, 
supra note 6. 
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (Supp. 2017). Adopted in 2016, it empowers individual 
legislators to request that the Arizona Attorney General investigate local laws for potential 
conﬂicts with state law. Id. § 41-194.01(A). If the Attorney General concludes that a local or-
dinance conﬂicts with state law, then the local government must resolve the violation within 
thirty days or face a loss of state shared revenue. Id. § 41-194.01(B). If the Attorney General 
concludes that a local ordinance may be preempted, then the statute directs the Attorney Gen-
eral to ﬁle a special action to resolve the issue, but local governments can only contest the 
determination by posting a bond in an amount equal to the prior six-months’ worth of state 
shared revenue. Id. § 41–194.01(B)(2). The Arizona Supreme Court recently upheld portions 
of the statute, although the court also expressed concerns about some of the statute’s more 
punitive aspects, particularly the bond provision, which in the case at issue would have re-
quired the city of Tucson to post a bond to cover over ﬁfty-ﬁve million dollars in revenue, the 
cost of which would have exceeded the city’s entire available reserves. See State ex rel. Brnovich 
v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 671-72 (Ariz. 2017). 
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in 2003 by creating personal civil liability for officials who vote for laws that con-
ﬂict with the state’s ﬁrearm preemption statute.
52
 Florida followed suit in 2011, 
enacting a range of sanctions on individual officials for “knowing and willful vi-
olations” of the state’s ﬁrearm preemption statute, including civil ﬁnes of up to 
ﬁve thousand dollars, barring officials from using public funds for legal defense 
or reimbursement of ﬁnes, and providing that violation of the statute constitutes 
cause for termination of employment or removal from office by the governor.
53
 
Since then, more states have opened up local officials to ﬁnes, removal, and civil 
litigation.
54
 Perhaps most remarkably, Kentucky, for ﬁrearms, and Texas, in its 
antisanctuary legislation, have now opened local officials to potential criminal 




52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.24(D) (2018) (“When a person’s rights pursuant to the protection 
of the preemption provisions of this section have been violated, the person shall have the right 
to bring a civil action against the persons, municipality, and political subdivision jointly and 
severally for injunctive relief or monetary damages or both.”). 
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33(3)(c)-(e) (West 2017). But see Marcus v. Scott, No. 2012-CA-
001260, 2014 WL 3797314 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 2, 2014) (holding § 790.33(3)(e) unconstitu-
tional). The Florida law also gives affected individuals and groups a private right of action 
against local governments for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as actual damages of 
up to $100,000 and attorneys’ fees. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33(3)(f) (West 2017). In the wake 
of the Parkland school shooting, which took place in Broward County, Florida, local govern-
ments and individual officials recently ﬁled three additional lawsuits challenging the punitive 
aspects of Florida’s ﬁrearm preemption law. Broward County v. State, No. 2018-CA-000882 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. ﬁled Apr. 30, 2018); City of Weston v. Scott, No. 2018-CA-000699 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
ﬁled Apr. 2, 2018); Daley v. State, No. CACE 18-008664 (Fla. Cir. Ct. ﬁled Apr. 2, 2018) (joint 
motion to consolidate ﬁled July 2, 2018); see also Lisa J. Huriash, 10 More Cities Join Gun Law-
suit Against Florida, SUNSENTINEL (May 16, 2018, 6:30 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com
/news/ﬂorida/ﬂ-reg-more-cities-join-gun-lawsuit-20180516-story.html [https://perma.cc
/4BG5-C2AR] (discussing a proposed Parkland lawsuit brought by more than ten Florida cit-
ies “against the state, seeking the power to regulate ﬁrearms”); Katie Zezima, Fla. Officials 
Who Try to Strengthen Gun Laws Can Be Personally Fined, Kicked Out of Office, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 26, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ﬂa-officials-who-try-to 
-strengthen-gun-laws-can-be-personally-ﬁned-kicked-out-of-office/2018/04/25/ada1fe28 
-4825-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html [https://perma.cc/6SY8-UK4Y] (discussing the 
post-Parkland litigation).  
54. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108(I)-(K) (2017) (allowing private litigants to pursue 
personal sanctions against local officials in ﬁrearm preemption conﬂicts; allowing termination 
from office and civil penalties of $50,000; and providing a private right of action against local 
governments to recover damages of up to $100,000 as well as attorneys’ fees and costs); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 45-9-53(5)(a), (c) (2015) (establishing a private right of action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief and holding any “elected county or municipal official under whose juris-
diction the violation occurred” civilly liable for up to $1,000, plus attorneys’ fees and costs 
that may not be paid, or defended against, through public funds). 
55. In 2012, Kentucky amended its ﬁrearm preemption statute both to create a private right of 
action, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870(4) (LexisNexis 2014), and to impose a criminal penalty 
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This new landscape of preemption has prompted a vigorous response from 
cities and other local governments, as well as from their officials and advocates 
who have seen hard-fought local policy gains fall. Despite the nominally limited 
formal authority that local governments possess to challenge state oversight, a 
number of legal tools have been deployed in recent preemption battles.
56
 The 
resulting cases have yielded mixed results in challenging preemption, but more 
success than traditional narratives of local legal powerlessness would augur. 
In many current state/local conﬂicts, cities are asserting versions of direct 
claims under home rule and related doctrines. The most notable examples are 
state constitutional bans on “special” or “local” legislation or similar require-
ments of generality designed, in part, to protect local governments from targeted 
and arbitrary interference.
57
  Cleveland, for example, has challenged Ohio’s 
preemption of the city’s “Fannie Lewis Law,” an ordinance requiring the hiring 
of city residents on public construction contracts.
58
 The Ohio Court of Appeals, 
ruling in favor of the city, found that the relevant state enactment was not a “gen-
eral law” that would validly preempt the ordinance, because the state enactment 
was not part of a comprehensive, statewide enactment, and instead only aimed 




on officials: “A violation of this section by a public servant shall be a violation of either KRS 
§ 522.020 [official misconduct in the ﬁrst degree] or § 522.030 [official misconduct in the sec-
ond degree], depending on the circumstances of the violation,” id. § 65.870(6). The prevail-
ing party in such a civil suit is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as expert witness 
fees. Id. § 65.870(4). 
In 2017, Texas similarly included a provision in its anti-sanctuary-cities legislation that 
subjects local law enforcement officials to criminal penalties if they fail to comply with immi-
gration detainer requests. See S. 4, 85th Leg. § 5.02 (Tex. 2017) (adding a new Class A misde-
meanor offense in § 39.07 of the Texas Penal Code); see also infra note 66 and accompanying 
text (discussing the litigation over this bill). 
56. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 2008-17; see also Schragger, supra note 6, at 1216-26 (describing 
general legal defenses for city power in the face of state attempts at centralization). 
57. Special legislation bans provide that state legislatures can exercise their plenary authority in 
general terms, but cannot target the exercise of that power on local governments—or private 
individuals and entities—in ways that impermissibly single out the object of legislation. See 
Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as Structural Restraints, 
40 J. LEGIS. 39, 46 (2014). Traditionally, most courts have been deferential and have treated 
these bans as versions of equal protection claims, see id. at 53-56, but the recent wave of 
preemption litigation is showing glimmers of renewed strength in the doctrine as states are 
being much more targeted in their oversight. 
58. City of Cleveland v. State, 90 N.E.3d 979, 981-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). 
59. Id. at 988-89. In some states, speciﬁc local governments enjoy additional constitutional pro-
tection against being singled out, and that protection has also arisen in current preemption 
conﬂicts. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables, No. 2016-018370-CA-01, slip op. 
at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2017) (ﬁnding an attempt by Florida to preempt a local ban on 
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Similarly, some recent cases involve once-obscure state legislative procedural 
requirements, such as constitutional “single-subject” mandates, to strike down 
preemptive legislation appended to entirely unrelated bills.
60
 In the St. Louis 
minimum wage litigation, for example, the Missouri Supreme Court found it 
unconstitutional for the state to have appended a preemption provision to a bill 
otherwise—and entirely unrelatedly—directed “to the establishment, proper 
governance, and operation of community improvement districts.”
61
 Similarly, an 
Ohio court recently struck down provisions of a state statute that would have 
preempted several areas of local workplace regulation—provisions appended to 
a bill originally focused on regulating the sale of puppies.
62
 
Current state/local conﬂicts also implicate federal constitutional doctrines 
and statutes, both in terms of structural provisions and individual rights. The 
challenge over Alabama’s preemption of Birmingham’s minimum wage, for ex-
ample, involves claims under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment (for intentional discrimination and on equal protection political-
process grounds
63
), Fifteenth Amendment, and a claim under section 2 of the 
Federal Voting Rights Act
64
—all of which were unsuccessful before the Northern 
District of Alabama, with dismissal conﬁrmed by the Eleventh Circuit, with the 
notable exception of the plaintiff’s intentional discrimination equal protection 
claim.
65
 And the challenge by the small border community of El Cenizo and 
other local governments to Texas’s anti-sanctuary-city law raised First and Four-
teenth Amendment concerns. In addition, being required to comply with federal 




Styrofoam violated the Florida constitution’s protection against legislation singling out mu-
nicipalities in Miami-Dade County). 
60. For background on these procedural constraints, see generally Martha J. Dragich, State Con-
stitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single 
Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (2001). 
61. Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Mo. 2017) (ﬁnding a violation 
of MO. CONST. art. III, § 23). 
62. City of Bexley v. State, 92 N.E.3d 397, 404-06 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2017) (interpreting OHIO CONST. 
art. II, § 15(D)). 
63. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982). But see Schuette v. Coal. 
to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any 
Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (raising questions about the continuing 
viability of this strand of equal protection doctrine). 
64. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). 
65. See generally Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2018) (dismissing all consti-
tutional claims save for the equal protection claim alleging intentional discrimination). 
66. These claims received a generally favorable audience at the district court level, but the Fifth 
Circuit was much more skeptical. It found merit in this array of facial challenges essentially 
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Whether these cases involve questions of state constitutional authority and 
process, home rule, or individual rights, they all engage in a renewed jurispru-
dence of local power.
67
 In resolving these claims, courts are deﬁning the scope of 
local power and the nature of the state-local legal relationship, at times directly 
and at other times obliquely. Regardless, the legal construction of localism is ever 




The bulk of these conﬂicts have played out against the backdrop of the rise 
of cities that are increasingly progressive, in states with conservative state legis-
latures or uniﬁed conservative control of state political branches.
69
 Preemption, 
of course, also occurs in progressive states with relatively conservative local gov-
ernments. Indeed, that has traditionally been the valence of state/local conﬂicts 
over issues such as affordable and fair housing, with states such as New Jersey 
and Massachusetts having long taken signiﬁcant steps to cabin local exclusionary 
policies.
70
 More recently, California and Illinois constrained the ability of local 
governments to cooperate with federal immigration officials.
71
 Preemption can 
 
only in First Amendment concerns. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. 
Tex. 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction), injunction aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs had not made a showing that they are 
likely to succeed on the merits of any of their constitutional arguments except their First 
Amendment claim). 
67. Cf. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2009) (“Deﬁning the scope of this local sovereignty, and thereby 
shaping the constitutional relationship between state and local governments, is a task that has 
largely fallen to the state courts.”). 
68. Contemporary state/local conﬂicts are primarily about the “immunity” function of localism, 
which is to say the legal authority that protects local governments from state overrides. 
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 377-97. That is not to say that the “initiative” func-
tion—deﬁning when local governments can act in the ﬁrst place, id. at 351-77—is entirely ab-
sent from current city/state tensions. See, e.g., Coop. Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 
S.W.3d 571, 586-87 (Mo. 2017) (rejecting the argument that regulating wages is beyond the 
power of localities in Missouri). But cities and other local governments seem generally to be 
acting within the scope of their initiative authority in these conﬂicts. 
69. See Riverstone-Newell, supra note 3, at 406. 
70. See J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265 (1997) (book review); Paul 
K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the 
Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992). 
71. See Julia Esparza, Illinois Is Officially a ‘Sanctuary State’ for Immigrants, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 
2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/hoy/ct-hoy-illinois-is-officially-a 
-sanctuary-state-for-immigrants-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/J43B-VBHT]; 
Katy Steinmetz, California Just Became a ‘Sanctuary State.’ Here’s What That Means, TIME (Oct. 
5, 2017), http://time.com/4960233/california-sanctuary-state-donald-trump [https://perma
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be a bipartisan issue,
72
 but that only throws into sharper relief the consequences 
of arguments for local empowerment in a polarized climate. 
In short, in the past ﬁve or six years, a signiﬁcant and rising wave of state 
intervention in local political and policy ordering has given rise to a correspond-
ing wave of litigation seeking to vindicate the authority of local governments and 
the individual rights of officials and citizens caught in the partisan crossﬁre. 
These dynamics, coupled with the renewed political salience of preemption, are 
bringing questions of the legal dimensions of localism to the fore across the 
country in fundamental ways. The nature of localism and how the legal system 
structures the state-local relationship are front and center once again. 
i i .  revisiting the dilemma of localism  
As the new preemption laws and their localist counterarguments clash, a 
longstanding concern
73
—not unique to state-local dynamics
74
—has resurfaced. 
Decentralization and devolution are often laudable in theory, but can be trou-
bling in fact. That reality has always been a challenge, but recent political and 
cultural polarization, coupled with patterns of mobility that accentuate geo-
graphic aspects of that polarization,
75
 have sharply exacerbated the progressive 
city/conservative state overlay on the dilemma. Before turning to this Essay’s 
approach, this Part ﬁrst surveys the terms of the debate and reviews themes in 
the responses offered to date. 
 
.cc/XD88-VX7G]; Priscella Vega, Huntington Beach Prepares to Sue State to Challenge ‘Sanctu-
ary’ Immigration Laws, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018, 8:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/socal
/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-hb-sanctuary-city-20180403-story.html [https://perma.cc
/6SND-HZYY]. 
72. See, e.g., Rachel Dovey, Dem and GOP Mayors Agree: States Must Stop Preempting Local Laws, 
NEXTCITY (Jan. 24, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/dem-gop-mayors-agree-states 
-must-stop-preempting-local-laws [https://perma.cc/XS9B-RMK9]. 
73. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346 (1990). 
74. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The dilemma of localism in the current era of polar-
ization echoes similar debates about so-called fair-weather federalism and partisan skewing 
(across the political spectrum) of perspectives on the executive-legislative balance in separa-
tion of powers. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, No More Fair-Weather Federalism, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 18, 
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/limit-federal-power-left 
-right-can-agree [https://perma.cc/YDF2-2H3U]. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31. 
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A. The Case for Local Empowerment and the Challenge of Parochialism 
The primary structural and normative arguments in favor of and against de-
volution and decentralization within the states are well rehearsed in the litera-
ture. But given the new salience these arguments have taken on in the current 
environment, it is worth pausing to reﬂect on their contemporary valence. 
On the one hand, the case for the legal empowerment of cities, counties, 
towns, and other local governments in our federal system has long progressed 
along lines that mix the advantages of small scale with the positive valence of 
decentralization.
76
 Local governments, the argument goes, serve as critical sites 
for democratic participation and local political engagement.
77
 Local participation 
reinforces bedrock public values as people learn to cooperate to solve problems 
that face much more signiﬁcant collective-action challenges at larger scales. As a 
result, local governments have a distinctive capacity to reﬂect community needs 
in polities that foster local voice.
78
 
Moreover, localities have a particularly important role to play in a distrib-
uted, competitive approach to policy experimentalism.
79
 If ﬁfty states allow pol-
icy innovation and evaluation, then so much the better to empower ninety thou-
sand local governments to be entrepreneurial problem solvers. These localities 
are especially well positioned to experiment because they may be armed with 
much greater sensitivity to local variation and the immediate accountability that 
comes from having to reckon with policy failure. And, for many commentators, 
 
76. The general case for localism is often a mix of empirical propositions and normative prefer-
ences. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic De-
fense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2022-23 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)). 
77. The democratic-participation argument is often associated with Alexis de Tocqueville’s paean 
to towns as schools for democracy, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey 
C. Mansﬁeld & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835), but the 
focus on local democracy and the normative value of participation has a much broader lineage, 
see, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (advocating 
participationist ideals in local governance). 
78. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
(1999); Hills, supra note 76; see also Daniel Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 413 (2017) (offering a comparative historical examination of northern U.S. 
“communitarian” localism with southern “proprietary” localism). For a thoughtful critique of 
community-based accounts of localism, see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Lo-
calism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001). 
79. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Struc-
ture, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014). On the general case for devolution and policy experi-
mentalism, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
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local governments play a critical role—more so than the states alone—in vindi-
cating American federalism’s general concern with checking concentrated gov-
ernmental power by dispersing authority vertically.
80
 Local governments can be 




On the other hand, as Richard Briffault forcefully argued nearly thirty years 
ago, the normative and pragmatic case for local subsidiarity carries within it the 
seeds of its own destruction.
82
 Calling to mind Karl Llewellyn’s description of 
the internal contradictions inherent in the canons of statutory construction,
83
 
scholars can, and regularly do, pair most normative and pragmatic arguments in 
favor of local-government empowerment with corresponding deep concerns.
84
 
For example, for all of localism’s Tocquevillian promise, there can be a de-
cided lack of democratic engagement at the local level.
85
 Local actions also often 
have signiﬁcant practical and distributional implications for those not able to 
 
80. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K. 
Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism]. 
81. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1259 (2009) (exploring ways in which states and local governments can “tweak, challenge, 
and even dissent from federal law”). 
82. Briffault, supra note 9; Briffault, supra note 73; see also Briffault, supra note 11. 
83. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950). 
84. There is a general case to be made for centralization in some contexts, based on the advantages 
of uniformity for certain regulatory regimes and the need for a baseline of rights that should 
be set statewide (or, ideally, nationally), below which local governments cannot go (even if 
they can be more rights protective). It is appropriate to recognize that subsidiarity must be 
evaluated against these countervailing concerns, even while maintaining that there are many 
issues best resolved at the level of government closest to those governed. That said, the dis-
cussion in this Section focuses on a particular set of concerns about the harms that can ﬂow 
from localism. 
85. See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Lo-
cal Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 660 (2003) (discussing relatively low turnout in local 
elections); see also David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763 (2017) 
[hereinafter Schleicher, State Democracy] (exploring structural barriers to state and local elec-
toral participation); David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council 
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419 (2007) (explaining the legal-structural 
barriers to partisan contestation of local legislative elections and the consequences for local 
governance). 
the dilemma of localism in an era of polarization 
977 
participate in—or who are otherwise disadvantaged by—any particular local po-
litical process.
86
 Commentators have repeatedly raised alarms about the result-
ing tendency of some local governments to foster exclusion.
87
 And local policies 
often generate externalities and spillover effects not fully accounted for by local 
governments, especially in the fragmented metropolitan areas that deﬁne the 
context in which so many of those governments operate.
88
  Together, these 
strands of the critique of localism coalesce into an overriding concern with a par-
ticularly toxic vein of local parochialism that hardens a range of socioeconomic 
and racial inequalities. As Briffault aptly summarized the critique, “[l]ocalism 





86. Political-process failures at the local level can be understood in two dimensions. First, there is 
the concern that because of the scale of local governance, outsiders to the local polity can be 
systematically unrepresented in local decisions that affect their interests. See Briffault, supra 
note 73, at 382. Second, for some commentators, the pathologies of local political processes 
mean that residents face distinctive threats to their rights from their own local governments. 
See, e.g., CLINT BOLICK, LEVIATHAN: THE GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EROSION 
OF LIBERTY (2004); see also Clayton Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public 
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 960 (1991) (arguing 
that formal local legal powerlessness—embodied in the restrictive approach of Dillon’s Rule—
“can best be understood and justiﬁed as a judicial check on local tendencies to cater to special 
interests at the expense of other groups within [a] locality”). But see Richard Briffault, Home 
Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon’s Rule, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1011 (1991) (offering counter-
points to Gillette’s public-choice-capture perspective on localism). 
87. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 73; Schragger, supra note 78. On the racial dimensions of local 
exclusion, see, for example, Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the 
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Richard 
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1841 (1994); and David D. Troutt, Localism and Segregation, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
& COMMUNITY DEV. L. 323 (2007). Concerns with the exclusionary risks of local governance 
are no longer limited to polemics against suburban home voters, however, with even our larg-
est, most diverse cities raising alarms from scholars concerned about inclusion and equity in 
local governance. See Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 467 (2018). 
88. Some local-government scholars prefer a frame for the pathologies of localism that fore-
grounds negative externalities and public-choice perspectives on political-process failure as 
critical concerns. See infra text accompanying notes 104-105. On some level, those frames re-
capitulate concerns about parochialism through an alternative conceptual vocabulary, but to 
the extent that an overriding focus on the spillover effects of local decision-making, or on 
rational-actor simpliﬁcations of local official incentives, decenters other normative concerns 
implicated in the discourse of localism, a richer account is necessary. 
89. Briffault, supra note 9, at 1. Rick Hills likewise succinctly notes that those who value local 
government seemingly have to choose between the values that local governments can advance, 
such as direct political participation, “and the social inequality and parochialism that local 
governments also seem to promote.” Hills, supra note 76, at 2011-12.  
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Any argument for local empowerment, then, must account for the dark side 
of local parochialism. This challenge takes on a particular valence for advocates 
who are focused on the potential for cities and other local governments to ad-
vance equity, inclusion, redistribution, and social justice, especially as national 
politics become increasingly paralyzed and many states abandon those goals.
90
 
Any legal tool to vindicate the progressive potential of local governance can be 
used by local governments to undermine the very values underlying that poten-




This puts front and center whether there are workable and consistent struc-
tural principles to frame an approach to localism sensitive to this dilemma. In 
other words, is the argument for local legal empowerment only about reinforc-
ing local democracy and advancing the other normative and instrumental values 
of decentralization? Or is there an overriding normative constraint on subsidiar-
ity? Is it possible to ask what localism is for? 
 
A separate vein of concern focuses on the argument that cities, counties, suburbs, and 
towns, in their own particular ways, lack competence and are subject to particular risks of 
corruption and capture. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 77. This was once a critical source of concern, 
with the critique from capacity captured by John Stuart Mill’s argument that local officials, 
compared to those found at higher levels of government, are of a “lower average of capacities” 
as well as “almost certain to be of a much lower grade of intelligence and knowledge . . . .” 
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 279, 281 (London, 
Parker, Son & Bourn, West Strand 1861). Similarly, local governments have long been indeli-
bly linked to the city boss and efforts to combat municipal corruption. See, e.g., LINCOLN STEF-
FENS, New York: Good Government to the Test, in THE SHAME OF THE CITIES 279, 281-82 (1904); 
LINCOLN STEFFENS, Philadelphia: Corrupt and Contented, in THE SHAME OF THE CITIES, supra, 
at 193, 195-97. These generalizations no doubt still resonate for some commentators. But it 
would be hard to say that capacity and corruption—for all of the reality of ongoing challenges 
on both fronts—are at the heart of current normative debates about the legal identity of local 
governments. Thoughtful scholars more generally decry the structural forces—economic, so-
cial, and legal—that have undermined the ability of some local governments to respond to the 
challenges they face. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 
1118 (2014) (exploring the contemporary landscape of ﬁscally distressed cities). 
90. Advocates for local empowerment focused on different objectives may be no less concerned 
with questions of exclusion and local parochialism, but in the current environment, the di-
lemma that localism poses is sharpest for progressive advocates. 
91. For some advocates, there is an approach under which questions of consistency across con-
ﬂicts and underlying structural principles generally do not matter, and the task is the tradi-
tional advocate’s one—prevailing in given cases, even if that requires taking the opposite po-
sition on a given allocation-of-authority issue in another case. Advocates for particular policy 
outcomes can certainly feel comfortable with that position, but it is unsatisfying for advocates 
(let alone scholars) who approach the question from the perspective of structure. 
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B. A Typology of Extant Approaches 
A number of scholars have posited approaches for resolving the dilemma of 
localism. This Section outlines a basic typology of positions that range from 
strongly localist, to default state-centric, to approaches that calibrate what is at-
tractive and what is troubling about local empowerment through various func-
tional and formal lenses. Much can be learned from these attempts to navigate 
the challenge, but none are entirely satisfying.
92
 
1. Ecumenical Localism 
As some scholars have tried to tackle the challenge of subsidiarity in the face 
of the risk of local parochialism, others have forged ahead with arguments for a 
kind of all-in localism. For them, the case for local empowerment is strong 
enough to minimize any challenges that arise from parochialism. In a series of 
articles, for example, Heather Gerken has contended that for those concerned 
with equity and the position of minorities in contemporary American society, the 
potential for obtaining power at the local level should outweigh concerns that 
recalcitrant localities will warp localism for regressive ends.
93
 As a result, Gerken 
asserts, even for those most dubious of the record of “states’ rights” and other 
assertions of devolution as a screen to mask racial animus, there is much more 
to be gained from localism—in terms of integration and genuine democratic mi-
nority rule—than can be lost by relying solely on higher levels of government, 




92. A number of scholars have sought to rethink localism altogether. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, Decen-
tering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993) (defending decentralization through crit-
ical conceptions of subjectivity and the self that are instantiated in local governance); Schrag-
ger, supra note 78, at 375 (arguing for “a shift from a discourse of localism, which takes 
territorially deﬁned communities as a given, to a discourse of alternative localisms, which un-
derstands communities as products of contested political norms, arising simultaneously with 
the borders that deﬁne them”). There is great value in better clarifying the dilemma of local-
ism and providing conceptually challenging perspectives on how fundamentally to restructure 
local governance and community. However, advancing advocacy in practical terms around 
these theories is challenging, and the urgency of crafting workable approaches to thread the 
localist needle beneﬁts from this wisdom, even as it requires proceeding in more prosaic ju-
risprudential and institutional terms. 
93. See Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2012, at 37, 37-38 
[hereinafter Gerken, Progressive Federalism]; Gerken, Federalism, supra note 80, at 7-8. 
94. Gerken, Progressive Federalism, supra note 93, at 46-47 (“The federalism that haunts our his-
tory looks quite different from the form of local power that prevails now. Federalism of old 
involved states’ rights, a trump card to protect instances of local oppression. Today’s federal-
ism involves a muscular national government that makes policy in virtually every area that 
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It would be hard to deny the appeal of this account and similar thoughtful 
arguments for relatively full-stop devolution.
95
 These accounts have the virtue 
of consistency and an Occam’s Razor-like neutral principle that is certainly nor-
matively clear.
96
 But embracing this approach does require minimizing the real, 
structural, ineluctable problem of parochialism. This should not lightly be done 
if some other path is available to calibrate the beneﬁts of democratic decentrali-
zation against the harm at moments when local empowerment turns dark. 
2. Skeptical Localism 
Contrary to ecumenical localists, some scholars have advocated for the pri-
macy of state oversight. Briffault, for example, argued in a landmark pair of ar-
ticles that in practice localism has essentially been warped by the empowerment 
of exclusionary suburbs, with signiﬁcant consequences in terms of spatial socio-
economic and racial stratiﬁcation.
97
 As a result, he concluded that we need to rely 
on the states to police recalcitrant localities more actively.
98
 
There is much to commend in Briffault’s call for states to exercise more 
thoughtful oversight. The challenge, however, is that whatever optimism about 
the states one might have expressed in 1990 when Briffault ﬁrst made this argu-
ment seems no longer warranted in many states.
99
 States have suffered from in-
 
was once relegated to state and local governments. The states’ rights trump card has all but 
disappeared, which means that the national government can protect racial minorities and dis-
senters when it needs to while allowing local forms of power to ﬂourish.”). 
95. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 76. 
96. It bears noting that Gerken’s progressive case for subsidiarity proceeds against the backdrop 
of a federal and state constitutional system that tends to valorize centralization in most direct 
conﬂicts, whether in the context of federalism or localism. The so-called federalism revolution 
and generations of home-rule reform notwithstanding, courts are still most comfortable vin-
dicating the power of the federal government against the states under the Supremacy Clause 
and the power of the states against local governments under a variety of arguably more con-
stitutionally suspect grounds. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 9, at 96; Allison H. Eid, Preemption 
and the Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18-20 (2005). 
97. See Briffault, supra note 9; Briffault, supra note 73. 
98. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 6 (“New legal doctrines and governmental structures are needed 
to encourage state governments to take a state-wide perspective on local problems, to 
strengthen the states’ role in overseeing local power and overriding parochial actions and to 
increase state accountability for local functions and for ameliorating interlocal wealth differ-
ences.”). 
99. The democratic failures of many states, particularly in relation to their local governments, 
have been well documented, see Diller, supra note 29, at 290; Schragger, supra note 6, to which 
we can add the signiﬁcant problems arising from contemporary state gerrymandering, see Paul 
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creasingly sophisticated partisan gerrymandering, and local governments—cit-
ies in particular—already suffer from a range of structural inequities in state po-
litical systems.
100
 As a result, too many legislatures simply no longer reﬂect the 
voters of their states in general, and state political systems structurally margin-
alize their urban residents in particular. These states have become unreliable ar-
biters of the normal and legitimate oversight functions they have traditionally 
undertaken in less polarized times.
101
 
3. Functionalist and Formalist Localism 
Many approaches to localism are instrumental. Some rely primarily on func-
tionalist arguments to discern the appropriate balance between state and local 
authority. Others look primarily to formal sources of law, without directly ad-
dressing underlying concerns in what seemingly neutral formalism might yield. 
One leading functionalist account emphasizes the implications of the Tie-
bout mobility model in addressing the boundaries of localism. In its broadest 
understanding (although not the one that its namesake Charles Tiebout appears 
to have had in mind
102
), the model suggests that residential and other forms of 




Diller, The Political Process of Preemption (Sept. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle 
with author) (exploring connections between contemporary patterns of state legislative ger-
rymandering as well as other political-process failures and the legitimacy of preemption of 
local government authority). Moreover, David Schleicher has argued that state legislative 
races are increasingly second-order elections in which voters are unaware of state legislators’ 
stances on distinctly state or local issues. Schleicher, State Democracy, supra note 85, at 772-76. 
That is not unique to states—Schleicher’s argument pertains to some local governments as 
well, id. at 776—but it does underscore particular democratic challenges at the state level, dy-
namics that arguably give more scope to interest groups to capture state-level legislation. 
Interestingly, perhaps reﬂecting the change in the times, Briffault himself has shifted 
since Our Localism to embrace a more devolutionary position, notwithstanding the strength 
of his earlier critique. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 2017-25. 
100. See Diller, supra note 29, at 326. 
101. This arguably returns states to the position they played during the era that gave rise to the 
ﬁrst wave of home-rule reform, with state “ripper” bills selectively removing authority from 
local governments. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Govern-
ance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 805-06 (1992). 
102. William A. Fischel, Footloose at Fifty: An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary Essays, in THE 
TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 8, 15 
(William A. Fischel ed., 2006). 
103. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS 
SMARTER 137-54 (2013) (making the case for mobility as a political accountability tool). 
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Other functionalist accounts focus on measurable externalities as the guiding 
principle to discern when localism should be displaced. Absent negative spill-
overs, the argument goes, states should allow local governments policy free-
dom.
104
 And public-choice narratives that focus on political-process failure seek 
to surface the skewed incentives of local officials.
105
 
Courts often resolve complex questions of state/local allocation of power 
into a mix of formalist and functionalist attempts to discern realms of “local” or 
“statewide” interests. In doing so, they largely draw on ambiguous constitu-
tional and statutory text. For example, the basic inquiry in many home-rule 
states is the formalist exercise of “deﬁning and drawing lines between ‘local af-
fairs’ and ‘matters of statewide concern.’”
106
 The work of courts in these cases 
involves state constitutional and statutory interpretation, and the materials 
courts apply often themselves reﬂect a great deal of uncertainty.
107
 Courts ulti-
mately struggle through in a kind of constitutional common-law way.
108
 
Approaches grounded in formal sources or in the functionalism of “local” or 
“municipal” versus “statewide interests” have some distinct advantages, not the 
least of which is a great deal of tradition as well as attention to the pragmatic 
consequences of local empowerment. But relying on what might appear to be 
value-neutral formalism or functionalism in state/local conﬂicts can obscure the 
 
104. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1347, 1390-1407 (1997) (discussing dynamics in the allocation of authority that might inter-
nalize the externalities of local decentralized governments). 
105. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 86, at 961. 
106. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 67, at 1339 (citing, for example, Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 
990, 996 (Cal. 1992); and Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 
2008). 
107. See id. at 1344 (“The nature of the project is necessarily ad hoc: The courts are asked to evaluate 
speciﬁc exercises of municipal power against the background of language . . . that is notori-
ously ambiguous.”). 
108. See id. at 1349-65 (delineating practical categories in the judicial construction of local author-
ity). As Frank Michelman put it: 
[A] great deal of the law to which courts appeal as delineating local-government 
authority is actually so open, so little constrained or determined by constitutional 
or statutory texts, so little referable to any discoverable legislative intent—is rather 
so much and so obviously a product of doctrinal formulations evolved by judges in 
the course of case-by-case adjudication, from sources and inspirations quite beyond 
written texts or suppositious historical intentions—that whole masses can fairly be 
said to compose a ﬂoating “general law” of local government hardly less open to 
spontaneous judicial economizing, or less inviting to the rationalizing ambitions of 
a theorist, than is the corpus of private-law doctrine. 
Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial 
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 146 (1977). 
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normative judgments inherent in many of the most contentious of these con-
ﬂicts.
109
 As this Essay elaborates below, normativity is inevitable in questions of 
the vertical allocation of power. That fact should be acknowledged in resolving 
state/local conﬂicts, even if it is by no means the only relevant consideration.
110
 
* * * 
It is possible to draw some broad lessons from past attempts to grapple with 
the dilemma of localism. Approaches that make absolute claims in the direction 
of centralization or decentralization are ﬂawed, and we must recognize that all 
such approaches should be qualiﬁed in some fashion. Context matters: what 
might be innocuous in a diverse city might be pernicious in a racially and socio-
economically homogeneous suburb. Further, judicial engagement in questions 
of localism is unavoidable—conﬂicts over local authority and the scope of state 
oversight are going to end up in litigation because allocations of power are in-
herently contested. Finally, if we ever could, we can no longer rely on state-level 
political processes to get the allocation right. 
For those particularly concerned about equity and inclusion, past attempts 
to wrestle with the dilemma of localism have wisdom to offer, but they are worth 
revisiting against the backdrop of the current alignment of conﬂicts. What 
would it look like to craft a more direct attempt to provide operable structural 
principles that courts and other legal actors could use to distinguish between 
valid and invalid exercises of local authority, even when the alignment of con-
ﬂicts shifts? It is to that possibility that we now turn. 
 
109. This is not to ignore the proposition that functional conceptions of localism reﬂect normative 
values as well. See Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 
400-01 (2017). Legal concerns with externalities, for example, draw on analogous ideas from 
economics that have a normative dimension, even if some strands in the economics literature 
would seem to deny that. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 
155 (1979). The point here is that when legal institutions invoke seemingly value-neutral 
frames such as spillovers, they often do so without reﬂection of distributional and similar 
consequences. 
110. There are also accounts that try to calibrate devolution to the local-government level against 
the beneﬁts of centralization, or to bracket off speciﬁc policies that may be troubling at the 
local level through more targeted lenses. Thus, for example, in arguing for reclaiming home 
rule, David Barron seemed to carve out local parochialism largely focused on speciﬁc policy 
domains, noting that “inclusionary zoning powers need not entail concomitant recognition of 
a local right to exclude low-income housing.” Barron, supra note 9, at 2364. It is clarifying to 
be reminded of the trade-offs involved in subsidiarity and to have the most contentious of 
exclusionary practices called out, but that recognition does not fully answer the jurispruden-
tial question of how and on what basis to ﬁnd the right calibration. 
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i i i .  centering the normative in localism  
The need to reconcile the attractive and troubling aspects of localism is newly 
resurgent, but a solution continues to elude courts and scholars. While there is 
no simple way to resolve the dilemma, normative considerations undergirding 
the vertical allocation of power in the states should be more directly confronted, 
allowing evaluation of the valence of local power in light of the normative com-
mitments states have made. There are risks, to be sure, in elevating the norma-
tive dimension of localism: the values at stake can be indeterminate, and there is 
reason to be cautious about further enmeshing courts in what in many instances 
are essentially policy battles between disparate levels of government with mis-
aligned views. But given that the nature of the state-local relationship is being 
navigated now in active conﬂicts that demand resolution, the alternative is even 




This Part, accordingly, ﬁrst lays out the argument for centering normative 
considerations in discerning the outer margins of localism. It then argues for 
looking to state constitutional law as a source for those considerations, both in 
terms of individual-rights provisions and in the concept that delegation to local 
governments carries obligations to consider the broader general welfare of the 
state. It also elaborates what this approach might look like in practice. The Part 
then concludes by evaluating and responding to some important objections. 
A. Elevating Normativity in the Structure of State/Local Conﬂicts 
1. The Value in Elevating Normative Considerations to Discern the 
Boundaries of Local Authority 
If ecumenical localism obscures the fundamental dilemma, if state legisla-
tures are too often unreliable arbiters of the proper allocation of authority, and if 
traditional functional and formal tools are ultimately unavailing, then an ap-
proach that more directly addresses the challenge must be found. This Section 
describes the advantages of explicitly elevating normative considerations in dis-
cerning the outer boundaries of local autonomy. 
 
111. Much of the discussion in this Essay necessarily focuses on the judiciary, but there are other 
actors involved in deﬁning the legal nature of local identity, such as state legislators, admin-
istrators, and local officials. Local legal identity is also shaped by private citizens, who are so 
often involved in the politics and practice of localism, as well as in the process of constitutional 
change, which is much more malleable at the state than at the federal level. See Bruce E. Cain 
& Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reﬂections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1517, 1521-25 (2009). 
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In recent years, private-law scholars have recognized that normative consid-
erations are internal to areas of law—such as property, torts, contracts, and rem-
edies—in which concerns about equity, individual autonomy, self-authorship, 
and other values have traditionally been seen as engrafted onto prepolitical or 
instrumental understandings of the law. As Hanoch Dagan has argued, one 
branch of private-law theory views the values that govern the law’s approach to 
interpersonal relations as autonomous—external to those relations.
112
 An op-
posing view understands private law in more instrumental terms, viewing law’s 
approach to interpersonal relations as simply one more regulatory tool for the 
state, with no normative content.
113
 Dagan counters with the argument that in-
trinsic to private law are “features that constrain the types of rules it can legiti-
mately promulgate,”
114
 features that reﬂect social context and meaning, and thus 
inherently involve what Dagan calls collective values. This is ultimately a justiﬁ-
catory exercise grounded in the nature of reciprocal rights and obligations—that 
is, in the logic of private law. 
Private law is an imperfect analogy for resolving questions of governmental 
authority, but the broad point is that there are structures within seemingly au-
tonomous bodies of law that reﬂect collective understandings of social rela-
tions.
115
 That insight can be applied to the discourse of localism. The idea that 
legal actors should justify allocations of authority on grounds other than pure 
formal command, such as the text of a given state’s constitution, surfaces occa-
sionally in case law that acknowledges competing values in structural con-
ﬂicts.
116
 But the need to discern normative principles in state/local conﬂicts—to 
deﬁne a general realm of appropriate local power, with state oversight justiﬁed 
at the normatively troubling margins—should be more explicit. These principles 
should be understood not as external to localism, but, as with individual reci-
procity in private law, as arising from the state-local relationship itself. 
Recognizing the potential for vertical structural questions to be resolved by 
reference to underlying, value-reﬂecting norms would have several beneﬁts. It 
would focus the terms of advocacy for local authority, rendering the nature of 
the conﬂicts more transparent. Over the long run, a more normatively inﬂected 
 
112. HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW 
THEORY 106 (2013) (“Private law, in this view, is a realm with its own inner intelligibility, 
isolated from the social, economic, cultural, and political realms.”). 
113. Id. (“Private law is, in this view, indistinguishable from other regulatory regimes, either in the 
type of aims it can promote or in the means it can legitimately use in order to achieve them.”). 
114. Id. at 107. 
115. There is a broad literature on the normative dimensions of private law. See, e.g., Stephen A. 
Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (2011). That literature 
need not be rehearsed here. 
116. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1118-21 (Utah 1981). 
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advocacy could reﬁne the terms of decisions about localism. That, in turn, can 
reinforce the positive attributes of localism—including democratic participation, 
satisfaction of local preferences, and experimentation and innovation—while 
providing a vocabulary for grappling with marginal cases where state oversight 
is most justiﬁed in light of local parochialism. 
The real questions then become whether there are defensible sources to turn 
to in delineating the contours of those normative principles in conﬂicts over the 
boundaries of local power and what normative content those sources might plau-
sibly yield. One could argue that state law has already made whatever normative 
choices about vertical allocation of power are necessary and that courts should 
simply reﬂect that positive law. But so many areas of state-local jurisprudence 
involve constitutional provisions sufficiently indeterminate to invite interpreta-




This interpretive space leaves room for broader normative considerations, 
although those considerations should not, in turn, be unanchored. They should, 
ﬁrst and foremost, be defensible from within the positive law and doctrinal 
sources available for constructing local legal identity. There is undeniable value 
in thinking creatively about the possibility of deeper structural reform, or even 
in rethinking the nature of local governance. But the conﬂicts facing courts un-
derscore the need to probe what the existing legal system might realistically im-
plement. 
2. Sources of Normative Content—Of the Interplay of Individual Rights and 
General Welfare 
Two strands of state constitutional jurisprudence, in combination, hold 
promise as appropriate sources of normative commitment in calibrating the mar-
gins of localism. These strands are the individual-rights provisions of state con-
stitutions and the general-welfare constraint operative when the state delegates 
its plenary power to a geographically bounded local government. To be clear, this 
is not to argue that current localism doctrine necessarily reﬂects these two 
sources of normative-structural content, although it is possible to catch glim-
mers—however rare—in the case law.
118
 Rather, it is to argue that these sources 
might fruitfully be drawn on to reﬁne the jurisprudence in more explicitly nor-
mative terms. 
 
117. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 67, at 1338-39. 
118. See infra Section III.A.3. 
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As to the ﬁrst strand, the individual-rights provisions of state constitutions 
can provide insight into the normative commitments of a given state.
119
 States 
are not indifferent to values such as equality and equity, even if in the context of 
the jurisprudence of individual claims against the state those principles are often 
thinly realized.
120







 and environmental pro-
tection,
124
 at least in some states.
125
 These provisions mean that the state as a 
whole has made certain discernable normative commitments—embodied in the 
terms of the individual rights that the state has chosen to valorize—that can be 




119. Cf. Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitutionalism, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
849, 864-65 (1999) (discussing the extraction of moral dimensions from state constitutions). 
120. See generally Shaman, supra note 16 (describing the wide scope of protection some states have 
interpreted as inhering in their constitutional equality provisions). 
121. See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in 
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301 (2011). 
122. See C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears the Burden? The Place for Participation of Municipal Residents in 
Chapter 9, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 161, 169 (2015) (noting that “many state constitutions contain 
a variety of labor rights, such as ‘the right to an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and pro-
tection from blacklisting practices and private armies,’” as well as “labor-oriented positive 
state constitutional rights [that] include laborer’s liens, weakening of employer defenses to 
liability for workplace injuries, and, of course, workers’-compensation systems” (quoting 
EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 108 (2013))). 
123. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 869 
(2008). 
124. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential 
Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996). 
125. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (education); id. art. XVII, § 1 (social welfare); id. art. XIV, 
§ 1 (environmental protection). For an insightful history of the development of state consti-
tutional rights in the areas of education, employment, and environmental protection, see 
EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 67-197 (2013). 
126. Scholars have debated—and continue to debate—the extent to which states have saliently dis-
tinctive legal identities. Compare, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1077, 1110-11 (2014) (collecting scholarship that “reject[s] the notion of state identity 
altogether, at least for the majority of states”), with Elazar, supra note 119, at 861 (canvassing 
arguments that states represent individually distinctive societies, with an independent moral 
valence to their constitutional tradition). This is a debate that need not be resolved here. For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge, as Robert Schapiro has argued, that state 
constitutions represent at least “the collection of those particular values that various electoral 
supermajorities have seen ﬁt to enshrine . . . .” Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation 
in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 393 (1998). 
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These normative commitments will by necessity vary by state,
127
 which re-
inforces the value of working within each state’s particular constitutional tradi-
tion. That said, nearly every state has some form of equality norm enshrined in 
its constitution,
128
 and other important related values are relatively widely re-
ﬂected across state constitutional law as well.
129
 State courts should not be lim-
ited to express individual constitutional rights—or even state law—to ﬁnd con-
stitutional meaning in localism. But, again, those provisions are appropriate 
proxies for the values of a state precisely because they have been enshrined in 
state constitutions. 
In the current jurisprudence, there is already some interplay between indi-
vidual rights and questions of vertical structure.
130
 This interplay creates a spec-
trum that ranges from conﬂicts that at least nominally involve pure questions of 
structure—such as classic home-rule or Dillon’s Rule cases over local initiative 
or immunity—to cases that are directly about individual rights—such as the con-
stitutional claims raised by individual officials facing potential sanctions in the 
 
127. See generally G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998). 
128. There is a rich history of the development of state constitutional provisions, for example, that 
variously provide for equal protection or ban special privileges and immunities. See Shaman, 
supra note 16, at 1029-56 (surveying state approaches). One variation, for example, found in 
nine state constitutions, is provisions that state all laws ought to be instituted for the beneﬁt 
of the whole, rather than for the enjoyment of a speciﬁc subgroup of citizens. See, e.g., IOWA 
CONST. art. I, § 6 (“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General 
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, 
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”); see also MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 
VI; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. 
art. I, § 24; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7; VA. CONST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 34. Many 
state supreme courts have taken a so-called lockstep approach to state equality guarantees, 
declining to vary from federal equal protection doctrine, although that appears to be shifting. 
Shaman, supra note 16, at 1031 (noting “a signiﬁcant trend toward state independence from 
the federal conception of equality”); see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: 
STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018) (discussing state con-
stitutional protection for individual rights and the role of state court judges in forging an 
independent state constitutional jurisprudence). But see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protec-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757 n.73 (2011) (cataloguing state variation from federal equal 
protection but chiding states for not taking up the slack left by federal retrenchment). Re-
gardless of whether a state chooses to mirror federal equal protection in its individual-rights 
jurisprudence or strike an independent view, state constitutional equality guarantees remain 
available as a reﬂection of a state-level normative principle to inform the boundaries of local 
authority in state/local conﬂicts. 
129. See TARR, supra note 127, at 11-13. 
130. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (2012) (exploring rights and 
representation as means to protect vulnerable groups). 
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El Cenizo sanctuary-cities case.
131
 In between are cases that involve the overlap, 
which is to say rights-inﬂected structural questions and structure-inﬂected 
rights cases. A good example can be found in the Birmingham minimum wage 
dispute, which is being contested on equal protection grounds, powerfully rais-
ing the interplay between local-government power, preemption, and race.
132
 
Across the entire spectrum, to echo Briffault’s insights in Our Localism, nor-
mative considerations—if not the actual contents of the individual rights at is-
sue—inﬂuence structural doctrines, and structural principles bleed into rights 
cases. Individual rights can serve as a good approximation of areas where the 
normative dimension of localism should be most prominent in structural con-
ﬂicts. Making localism more explicitly normative, and in particular drawing on 
the normative content of state constitutional rights, would thus allow courts to 
foreground issues, such as race and inequality, that are obscured by functional 
approaches or are relegated to second-order considerations by strong devolu-
tionary accounts of localism. It would provide courts a means of addressing 
questions of racial subordination and economic inequality. 
This is not to argue that federal constitutional and statutory rights are an 
inappropriate source of normative content for localism.
133
 Federal rights have an 
important role to play in checking state excesses and can inform the state-local 
dialogue, as David Barron and Rich Schragger have each argued.
134
 Yet where 
 
131. See supra text accompanying note 66 (noting that in the challenge to Texas’s sanctuary-city 
law, individual officials raised due process, First Amendment, and Fourth Amendment 
claims). 
132. See Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2018) (reversing the dismissal 
of a claim that Alabama’s preemption of Birmingham’s minimum wage ordinance violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and noting that “[t]oday, racism 
is no longer pledged from the portico of the capitol or exclaimed from the ﬂoor of the consti-
tutional convention; it hides, abashed, cloaked beneath ostensibly neutral laws and legitimate 
bases, steering government power toward no less invidious ends”). 
133. Some advocates have argued that the solution to the dilemma of localism in light of concerns 
about equity and inclusion is to rely on federal equal protection as the primary doctrinal source 
to challenge state intrusion. See, e.g., Thomas Silverstein, Combating State Preemption Without 
Falling into the Local Control Trap, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL (Oct.-Dec. 2017), 
http://prrac.org/newsletters/octnovdec2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK6W-LFUY]. Antidis-
crimination law does, indeed, have much to commend it, but many important localist conﬂicts 
in the current environment will simply not be addressed by that body of law. State courts are 
going to continue to confront core questions of state constitutional allocation of authority for 
which federal equal protection can be relevant, but will likely not provide the ultimate ground 
of decision. 
134. See Barron, supra note 23, at 493 (arguing that in a series of equal protection cases, including 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 
(1986); and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court “enforced public con-
stitutional values by striking down state attempts to control the political discretion of towns 
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Barron and Schragger invoke localism as a means of vindicating individual fed-
eral rights, this Essay’s argument focuses on the inverse: where individual rights 
more generally can help delineate the boundaries of appropriate localism in light 
of the risk of parochialism.
135
 And the argument for speciﬁcally privileging state 
individual-rights provisions in delineating the outer boundaries of local power 
is in part pragmatic—state law is the canvas on which state courts and state leg-
islatures paint—but it is also conceptual in the sense that rights and structural 
norms from within a given state’s legal culture have the potential to advance in-
terpretive ﬁdelity when courts are confronted with competing state constitu-
tional texts and norms. 
However, in an era when individual-rights claims are increasingly limited—
and in which there is a relative paucity of economic and social rights (although 
less so at the state than at the federal level)—there remain some areas of poten-
tially troubling local discretion that cannot be addressed by rights cases alone. 
As much as the substance of individual rights can serve as a guide to a state’s 
normative commitments, courts can take an additional logical step to help trans-
late the values underlying those commitments—values that are not immediately 
associated with the balance of state and local authority—into the jurisprudential 
terms of localism. 
That leads to the second source of constitutional meaning to inform the outer 
bounds of localism. That source would involve incorporating a geographic view 
of “general welfare” in recognition that there are normative considerations in-
herently implicated in the broader context of the delegation of state authority to 
a local government. As with normative arguments that ﬂow from the logic of 
private law, invoking this understanding of general welfare provides a structural 
principle to bring values such as equity and inclusion to bear in the doctrine.
136
 
States, as a formal matter, are generally understood to possess plenary police 
power, subject only to articulated (federal and state) constitutional limitations 
and the constraints that come with federal supremacy.
137
 In practice, however, 
 
and cities”); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 167-68 (2005) (drawing on equal protection jurisprudence to argue 
for the constitutional space for cities to vindicate substantive constitutional rights in the con-
text of same-sex marriage, in the era prior to United States v. Windsor, 135 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), 
and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
135. Moreover, for fundamental questions of how courts should resolve disputes over the scope of 
local authority and autonomy, state constitutions—even if they parallel in some respects their 
federal counterpart—can offer a closer reﬂection of a state’s normative commitments. 
136. See supra Section III.A.1. 
137. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 54-55. This contrasts with the concept of the 
federal government as one of limited and enumerated powers, although in practice there are 
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state constitutional law recognizes that that plenary authority must advance the 
actual, general welfare of the people of the state. This constraint applies to all 
state action but can be understood to have a particular spatial component when 
the state delegates (through home rule or by statute) a portion of its plenary 
power to a geographically bounded locality
138
 : the exercise of that delegated 
power must reﬂect consequences that affect the state as a whole.
139
 
This spatially inﬂected understanding of general welfare thus supplies an 
operative principle to translate normative commitments into the structural terms 
of state/local conﬂicts.
140
 Externalities are usually thought of in pragmatic, ma-
terial terms—the paradigmatic trash dump on the edge of a town that leaches 
 
relatively few constraints on federal authority and relatively robust limitations on state plenary 
authority, despite the theory. 
138. Or, to put this in the terms of democratic accountability, when the people of a state subdele-
gate some of the authority that they have given to their state back down to speciﬁc local com-
munities. 
139. General welfare is a formulation that often derives from due process and equal protection 
doctrine, or from the nature of the police power, and the idea of generality in the formulation 
is not often conceived in spatial terms. Some courts in the localism context, however, have 
done so. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 145-153, a prominent example 
can be found in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975), but other instances of linking general welfare to the spatial terms of localism oc-
casionally emerge in the jurisprudence. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, 
Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 485-89 (Cal. 1976); id. at 487 (“When we inquire 
whether an ordinance reasonably relates to the public welfare, inquiry should begin by asking 
whose welfare must the ordinance serve. In past cases, when discussing ordinances without 
signiﬁcant effect beyond the municipal boundaries, we have been content to assume that the 
ordinance need only reasonably relate to the welfare of the enacting municipality and its resi-
dents. But municipalities are not isolated islands remote from the needs and problems of the 
area in which they are located; thus an ordinance, superﬁcially reasonable from the limited 
viewpoint of the municipality, may be disclosed as unreasonable when viewed from a larger 
perspective.”); cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (alluding, 
in the course of upholding a local government’s zoning code, to “cases where the general pub-
lic interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would 
not be allowed to stand in the way”). 
140. Another variation on the concept of a geographically inﬂected general welfare can be found in 
a recent decision that upheld a City of Cleveland law requiring a portion of jobs in publicly 
funded projects to be staffed by local residents against an Ohio preemptive statute. The court 
found, among other things, that the state constitutional provision invoked by the Ohio legis-
lature to preempt Cleveland’s local-hire law was not a valid source of authority because the 
Ohio constitution required any state regulation of labor conditions under the provision to 
advance the general welfare, which the trial court concluded was absent when the state barred 
the city’s authority. See City of Cleveland v. State, 90 N.E.3d 979, 988-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2017). Setting aside the merits of local-hire policies, the resonance of this vein in the jurispru-
dence is that it emphasizes the need for the exercise of state authority to reﬂect the general in 
the concept of general welfare. 
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into the neighboring town’s water—and are also often invoked in assessing po-
litical-process failure, couched in terms of either capture or insufficient attention 
to those not represented in a local polity.
141
 Yet there can be a normative dimen-
sion to the geography of general welfare. Much of what cities and other local 
governments do is contained within their boundaries—contained, that is, not 
just in the sense of physical and regulatory spillovers, but also in terms of the 
policy valence of the choices that local governments make. When local govern-
ments exercise their authority as a means of racial, economic, or similar exclu-
sion, their parochialism has an inherently normative dimension. That exercise 
can offend the values of the state as a whole and can therefore in turn justify state 
intervention. Explicitly considering the general welfare of the state in evaluating 
the boundaries of local power provides a mechanism for limiting the most per-




Calibrating the normative outer boundaries of localism by focusing on the 
overlap between these two sources of constitutional meaning, a variation on what 
Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett have called intersectional rights,
143
 carries 
several advantages. Together, individual-rights provisions and a spatial under-
standing of general welfare can, for example, cabin what might otherwise be an 
overly expansive judicial role in resolving state/local conﬂicts. This conjunction 
 
141. See supra note 86. 
142. Recognizing that a spatial version of “general” in the idea of general welfare can be a structural 
ﬁlter for the outer boundaries of local authority—that courts and other legal actors can explic-
itly ask what deeper obligations local governments must attend to that transcend their bound-
aries—does not undermine the basic case for subsidiarity. Quite the opposite. In a frame 
premised on the proposition that policy issues should, as a starting point, be addressed at the 
level of governance closest to those governed, explicitly attending to the broader normative 
implications of local authority can supply outer boundaries, even while preserving a strong 
central core of localism. 
143. See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
1309, 1330 (2017) (noting that “many constitutional cases involve multiple constitutional 
claims that gain meaning when heard together and amplify the cognizable harm”); see also 
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1077-91 (2016) 
(exploring judicial approaches to the interplay between federal constitutional provisions, both 
within and across rights and structure). What in some contexts are called “hybrid rights”—
from cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990)—have been criticized for illogic and incoherence. See, e.g., Jonathan B. 
Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. 
L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (labeling the hybrid-rights doctrine “logically ﬂawed and ultimately 
untenable”). This Essay, however, invokes the interplay between structure (embodied in the 
normative dimensions of the concept of general welfare) and individual rights, not to amplify 
overlapping constitutional harms but to cabin and make more coherent judicial resolution of 
fraught questions of the vertical allocation of power. 
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provides a way of targeting what could otherwise be a free-ﬂoating judicial ex-
ercise, and grounds the exercise in clearly identiﬁable legal sources. 
Bringing together these two streams of jurisprudence would also have the 
advantage of incorporating the normative concerns underlying the individual-
rights provisions of state constitutional law into the fabric of state authority, 
while at the same time avoiding the necessity of individual litigation to vindicate 
those rights. It is appropriate—indeed critical—to resort to rights-based litiga-
tion to correct egregious cases, but the values reﬂected in the rights that states 
supply can also inform the scope of state-local dynamics.
144
 
3. The Jurisprudential Model in Practice 
Are there any precedents for what this theory might look like in practice? 
One example, familiar to scholars of local governance, property law, and fair 
housing, can be found in a certain reading of a doctrine named for the town in 
southern New Jersey from which it sprang: Mount Laurel.
145
 In the mid-1970s, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court stared down ongoing segregation fostered by 
exclusionary zoning and other local practices in the state, with the city of Mount 
Laurel as the paradigmatic battleground. Mount Laurel had functionally zoned 
out all but high-cost, single-family detached housing, which put living in the 
community out of ﬁnancial reach for low- and moderate-income people.
146
 
Plaintiffs—people concerned about conditions in Mount Laurel as well as those 
barred from living in the community
147
 —challenged the township and pre-
vailed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that local governments in the state 
 
144. Focusing the inquiry on the intersection between rights and a spatial conception of general 
welfare can also provide a theoretical underpinning for the argument that the appropriate 
approach to substantive constitutional rights provisions is for higher-level governments to set 
a ﬂoor, above which local governments can craft policy. This makes sense as a formal matter, 
given that state and federal constitutional rights apply to local governments no less than to 
state governments, but it extends this institutional arrangement to the structure of the state-
local relationship. 
145. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975). 
146. See id. at 719-24. 
147. As the court described the plaintiffs, they were “minority group poor (black and Hispanic)” 
people comprised of “present residents of the township residing in dilapidated or substandard 
housing; . . . former residents who were forced to move elsewhere because of the absence of 
suitable housing; [and] nonresidents living in central city substandard housing in the region 
who desire to secure decent housing and accompanying advantages within their means else-
where,” as well as “three organizations representing the housing and other interests of racial 
minorities.” Id. at 717 & n.3. 
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In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the intersection between the 
general-welfare constraint on delegation of authority under the New Jersey Con-
stitution and the fundamental importance of housing. As the court put it, “any 
police power enactment . . . must promote public health, safety, morals or the 
general welfare,” adding that the “last term seems broad enough to encompass 
the others.”
149
 As to whose general welfare was at stake, the court continued, 
“local authority is acting only as a delegate of [the state’s] power and . . . when 
regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state’s citi-




Looking to the concept of general welfare alone was not sufficient to deline-
ate the limits on local authority; rather, the court needed an underlying norma-
tive concern to give content to the relevant terms of the broader welfare at issue. 
The court accordingly invoked the importance of housing in New Jersey law.
151
 
As the court put it: 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with food, are the 
most basic human needs. “The question of whether a citizenry has ade-
quate and sufficient housing is certainly one of the prime considerations 
in assessing the general health and welfare of that body.” . . . It is plain 
beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all catego-
ries of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the gen-
eral welfare required in all local land use regulation. Further the universal 
and constant need for such housing is so important and of such broad 
public interest that the general welfare which . . . municipalities . . . must 
consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially con-




148. Id. at 731-32. The original Mount Laurel decision was limited to “developing municipalities,” 
id. at 734, but the New Jersey Supreme Court later expanded the reach of the doctrine and 
changed its remedial scope in South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 
(Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
149. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725 (noting that the authority to delegate is constrained by state-
level conceptions of equal protection and due process that yield a requirement that such del-
egation be exercised for the general welfare). 
150. Id. at 726. 
151. Id. at 727. 
152. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Housing was not, to be sure, a clearly established individual constitutional 
right, but the Mount Laurel court found the interest advanced by state support 
of housing clearly implicated in the spatial concept of general welfare at issue in 
the zoning controversy before it. The court thus brought to the surface both the 
regional (spatial) and normative dimensions of Mount Laurel’s exclusion, and 
Mount Laurel’s constitutional theory relied on the intersection of those consid-
erations. 
The controversy that Mount Laurel sparked continues to reverberate more 
than forty years later, fostering a fraught judicial relationship with the state and 
with local governments in New Jersey.
153
 Despite well-founded critiques that 
Mount Laurel stretches the boundaries of the judicial role too far,
154
 it is possible 
to read the constitutional theory underlying the case in more modest and prag-
matic terms. Instead of an institutional justiﬁcation for affirmative judicial inter-
vention in local ordering—as the case gave rise to a large judicial bureaucracy 
necessary to enforce its terms in the face of local recalcitrance—the doctrine can 
be read as allowing courts to distinguish between more or less normatively valid 
grounds for the assertion of local autonomy in state/local conﬂicts.
155
 
Applied to the current wave of state/local conﬂicts, the framework developed 
above would surface underlying normative tensions across areas as diverse as 
workplace regulation, antidiscrimination, environmental protection, public 
health, broadband, and many others in the current social and political reckon-
ing.
156
 Take controversies over sanctuary cities. As noted, a number of states 
have passed or are considering legislation that would bar local governments from 
a range of policies that states understand to constitute “sanctuary.”
157
 At the 
same time, some states have declared their support for such policies and have 
legislatively constrained the ability of their local governments to assist federal 
 
153. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AF-
FORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB (2013). 
154. See infra Section III.B. 
155. It bears acknowledging that there are a variety of procedural and doctrinal questions that the 
framework might implicate, from standing, choice of forum, comity, or any of the myriad of 
technical questions that arise in any particular case involving the balance of state and local 
authority. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to elaborate on those many variations, but the 
core insights should generally pertain, even if they might be instantiated in different ways in 
different cases. 
156. On the other hand, most states have a version of a state constitutional right to bear arms, 
which advocates in favor of restricting local variation in ﬁrearm safety regulation might in-
voke. See generally Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 191 (2006) (charting the provisions across forty-four states and their variation 
from the Second Amendment). 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
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law enforcement with deportation and related policies.
158
 There are, then, two 
competing normative visions of the boundaries of local authority at issue in con-
ﬂicts over state oversight. On the one hand, local governments are choosing to 
prioritize values of inclusion, the beneﬁts of economic development that come 
through immigration, and the judgment that working with immigrant commu-
nities advances law enforcement by building trust and encouraging the reporting 
of crime. On the other, local governments are choosing—again, in the face of 
potential state preemption—to pursue policies, albeit reﬂecting the current fed-
eral approach, that are grounded in a very different moral vision. 
A normative lens on these conﬂicts would allow advocates to make the case 
that local exclusionary immigration policies, whether they formally violate fed-
eral or state equal protection clauses, run counter to equity norms reﬂected in 
state equality law and run counter to the broader general-welfare obligations of 
those local governments by singling out and targeting disfavored minorities sub-
ordinated in the political process. This would, in turn, provide grounds to make 
substantive distinctions between inclusive and exclusionary policies in the reso-
lution of clashing structural imperatives between a local government and the 
state. Courts might still choose to vindicate contrary state interests in the case of 
inclusionary local action and to reject state interests in the case of contrary ex-
clusionary local policies—and these are by no means simple decisions—but at 
least the terms of the debate would be clearer. 
* * * 
That, in short, is the core argument that there are defensible signposts that 
might offer some promise for constructing a coherent, textually grounded, im-
plementable conception of the outer boundaries of localism. This approach pro-
vides sufficient justiﬁcation for vindicating Cleveland’s moves to advance eco-
nomic fairness, but not Vista’s resistance to prevailing wages; El Cenizo’s 
welcome of immigrants, but not Hazelton’s hostility. In other words, an explic-
itly normative approach promises to help answer the dilemma of localism. 
B. Objections from Indeterminacy and Judicial Role 
Before concluding, there are some reasonable objections that are worth ac-
knowledging and evaluating. This Section addresses two particularly forceful ar-
guments: ﬁrst, that the norms at issue are too contested; and second, that courts 
are institutionally ill-suited to the task of discerning manageable normative 
 
158. See supra text accompanying note 71. California’s SB 54, for example, prevents local law en-
forcement from undertaking immigration enforcement with some exceptions, and from de-
taining individuals for deportation without a judicial warrant, among other things. 2017 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 495, at 95. 
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boundaries in this context. These concerns suggest the need for caution in ad-
vancing a more normatively inﬂected approach to resolving structural localist 
conﬂicts. But they do not mean that ultimately the game is not worth the candle. 
The ﬁrst concern is that the particular constitutional norms this Essay iden-
tiﬁes are deeply contingent and at the same time conveniently congruent with a 
certain set of speciﬁed outcomes. Is this just policy preference in the guise of 
structural constitutional law? Relatedly, as a pragmatic matter, what basis is 
there for trusting that courts will appropriately reﬂect the values at issue? Indeed, 
any attempt to embody normative values in the structure of localism could as 
easily turn into antilocal libertarian or property-rights exercises as it could pro-
vide a means for advancing local equity and inclusion.
159
 
These are natural critiques of any attempt to articulate a normative lens for 
discerning a positive or a negative valence of localism. However, the arguments 
for an inclusive or equity-sensitive account of localism—looking at state-based 
constitutional rights as well as taking seriously the idea that the general welfare 
has an inherent logic in the context of devolution as a doctrinal matter—can be 
made convincingly. It is true that arguing for devolution in normative terms may 
leave the jurisprudence open to other values, such as free speech, religious lib-
erty, or due process, that can rise to the surface. But a general libertarian case 
that local governments are distinctly threatening in their regulatory role and 
should be constrained on that basis seems weaker than normative arguments 
about exclusion and equity, even as speciﬁc threats to individual constitutional 
rights can be salient at the local level. Regardless, a debate that included those 
considerations would still have advantages over one that glossed over the possi-
bility of a normative valence to localism. 
It is, indeed, possible to invert the concern over local governments as partic-
ularly threatening to individual liberty and also separately address a concern with 
the overreliance on rights.
160
 If local governments are going to advance, rather 
than offend, the values reﬂected in the individual-rights provisions of state con-
stitutions (and perhaps even the Federal Constitution), then courts should vin-
dicate that role by protecting that aspect of local legal authority, even if the courts 
 
159. Cf. Barron, supra note 9, at 2364 (noting the indeterminacy of judicial interpretation of home 
rule and expressing concern that courts will be insufficiently sensitive to the normative valence 
of localism). 
160. There is a political-process risk in overly relying on rights and even milder forms of “rights 
talk” in localism, given that this shifts power toward the judiciary. In the current environment, 
however, especially given the partisan nature of many state/local conﬂicts, resort to litigation 
seems inevitable, and it is preferable for courts to be transparent about the exercise. 
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do not vindicate converse normative values.
161
 Ultimately, the framework this 
Essay proposes would allow advocates to argue about what is really at stake in 
many state/local conﬂicts: not just abstract concerns with devolving and decen-
tralizing power, but more immediately how the exercise of that local power in-
tersects with equity, inclusion, environmental protection, and the like—even if 
the case would have to be made in any given instance. That does not mean that 
these values will always prevail, but at least these would be the terms on which 
marginal cases could be addressed within a general case for local empowerment. 
A closely related concern focuses on judicial role and capacity. Can courts 
take on the task of calibrating localism as this Essay argues? Should they? As 
noted, the experience of New Jersey in the aftermath of Mount Laurel—where 
the judicial system essentially gave up trying to enforce the doctrine and ceded 
implementation to a state agency—suggests caution before urging any expan-
sion of judicial oversight in state/local conﬂicts.
162
 This line of reasoning could 
also draw on conceptions of democratic theory and separation of powers to posit 
that judicial resolution of vertical allocation-of-powers questions should be left 
to the political branches, even when state/local conﬂicts generally involve two 
polities. And there is certainly reason to be skeptical that, to the extent that 
city/state conﬂicts in the current environment reﬂect partisan polarization, state 
courts are necessarily going to be immune from those currents, especially given 




161. There is a pragmatic political dimension to this concern as well. Given the polarization that 
has generated the current wave of state/local conﬂicts in so many states, many state supreme 
courts likely reﬂect the politics of the state legislatures that are currently seeking to constrain 
local power. See Paul Brace et al., Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. 
POL. 387, 393-94 (2000) (discussing the relationship between state supreme court justices’ 
partisan affiliation and the ideology of the state at the time in which they were elected or 
appointed). For that reason, any advocacy that seeks to acknowledge a normative valence to 
localism may have to be advanced with awareness of the limits of potential receptivity, which 
advocates are perfectly capable of discerning. That said, for a variety of structural and timing 
reasons, there are some states where the current polarization of the state legislature is not 
reﬂected in a similarly polarized state supreme court. Id. (noting that “the relative consistency 
of a justice’s preferences with either citizens or the elite should be dependent upon the method 
of judicial selection operating in that state”). 
162. Indeed, home rule as a structural matter has long evinced the difficulty of a relatively central-
ized judiciary mediating state-local relations. A part of the thrust of the second wave of home-
rule reform was a desire to move questions of local authority out of the courts and into the 
state legislatures. See Barron, supra note 9, at 2325-28. 
163. Cf. Claire S. H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence 
from State Trial Court Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360, 1361 (2013) (noting the correlation 
between the preferences of constituents and sentencing outcomes at the trial level). 
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Concern over judicial role and competence is important, but not without re-
sponse. A more modest approach to the judicial role would recognize that inher-
ent in most state/local conﬂicts is the necessity of resolving otherwise open-
ended questions about what normative conceptions of localism should prevail. 
Vertical (state/local), horizontal (interlocal), and internal (local government-in-
dividual) legal conﬂicts are unavoidable and it is possible to limit the question 
in such cases to how best to construct a jurisprudence built around individual 




The reality is that as the state-local relationship becomes more confronta-
tional, courts cannot avoid the responsibility of adjudicating foundational ques-
tions of the allocation of power. Whether courts do so through formalist or func-
tionalist proxies, or through practical presumptions in favor of state power—
which is how most of these cases are currently decided, at least nominally—they 
risk obscuring the real stakes at issue. And trusting democratic processes to re-
solve the conﬂict, as attractive as that sounds, fails to appreciate the pathologies 
of the current landscape of state-local relations. 
It would be hard to deny that state supreme courts can reﬂect the politics of 
their state, but it would prove too much to regard the judiciary as inherently 
incapable of separating the partisan valence of given aspects of state/local con-
ﬂicts from the underlying merits. Admittedly, a framework grounded in the 
value of interpretive ﬁdelity in state constitutional law necessarily holds out hope 
that courts are not entirely political and that at least some state judicial systems 
will be receptive, even if that hope may be misplaced in many cases. Moreover, 
the process of judicial selection and the constituencies to which courts answer 
may not match the polarization of a given state, especially in states that are rela-




Even if it might be challenging for courts to change their approach, there are 
broader reasons to do so. This Essay has focused on jurisprudence, but an ap-
proach to localism that adds consideration of the normative valence of questions 
of structure interacts with other audiences and other institutions. It remains, and 
will remain, the fact that state legislatures are the primary legal institution set-
ting the terms of formal local legal power. At the moment, too many state legis-
latures are approaching their responsibility through the lens of partisan politics, 
 
164. Paul Diller has argued that courts have institutional advantages over state legislatures in re-
solving state/local conﬂicts, such as geographic impartiality, relative political insulation, and 
comparatively greater immediacy in ability to respond to conﬂicts. See Diller, supra note 18, at 
1157-68. 
165. See Barron, supra note 9, at 2364. 
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with insufficient respect for local democracy. In the long run, with careful advo-
cacy, this polarization might soften. The same can be said for state executive of-
ﬁcials and state administrative agencies, all of which are part of the state-local 
interplay, even if they do not set the primary terms of the legal landscape. 
Ultimately, questions of state/local power are as much political as they are 
legal, and any jurisprudence of localism will have to interact with popular per-
ceptions of the appropriate balance. This is because of electoral outcomes, and 
because constitutional change is much more ﬂexible at the state level than it is at 
the federal level. Repeatedly throughout the modern history of home rule, and 
in some cases quite recently, states have undertaken important constitutional 
changes to protect their localities. Those constitutional changes have been hon-
ored as much in the breach as in the spirit in which they were intended, but 
change can happen. 
conclusion 
Over a half century ago, in a widely regarded early exegesis of home rule, 
Terrance Sandalow asked “whether it is desirable, by a broad grant of power to 
municipalities, to permit local majorities to press hard against fundamental val-
ues.”
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 That question—and the broader dilemma of localism it reﬂects—is all 
the more urgent at a moment marked by rising social and political polarization 
and by the corresponding governance responsibility that cities and other local 
governments are embracing in the shadow of that polarization. 
This Essay has accordingly sought to limn a new approach to the legal struc-
ture of local empowerment, particularly for those who value deeply the promise 
of local governance but remain concerned about the challenge of local parochi-
alism. The argument privileges local autonomy as a core principle, but simulta-
neously grounds a search for the outer margins of local power in concerns for 
equity and inclusion drawn from a combination of individual rights and the con-
cept of a broader general welfare inherent in state delegation to geographically 
bounded local governments. Hard questions can certainly be raised about the 
feasibility of our imperfect legal institutions succeeding at the task of implement-
ing this approach with sensitivity and nuance. But as states seek to redeﬁne the 
nature of local governance, it is more critical than ever that we grapple with get-
ting the balance right. 
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